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FREE SPEECH SAVIOR OR SHIELD
FOR SCOUNDRELS: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF INTERMEDIARY IMMUNITY
UNDER SECTION 230 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
David S. Ardia *
In the thirteen years since its enactment, section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act has become one of the most important
statutes impacting online speech, as well as one of the most intensely
criticized. In deceptively simple language, its provisions sweep away
the common law's distinction between publisher and distributor
liability, granting operators of Web sites and other interactive
computer services broad protection from claims based on the speech of
third parties. Section 230 is of critical importance because virtually all
speech that occurs on the Internet is facilitated by private
intermediaries that have a fragile commitment to the speech they
facilitate.
This Article presents the first empirical study of the section 230
case law. It begins by providing a doctrinal overview of common law
liability for intermediaries, both online and offline, and describes how
section 230 modifies these doctrinal approaches. It then systematically
analyzes the 184 decisions courts have issued since the statute's
enactment. The Article also examines how courts have applied section
230, finding that judges have been haphazard in their approach to its
application.
The Article closes by discussing the study's findings and by
offering some insights into how plaintiffs and defendants have fared
under section 230. While section 230 has largely protected
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intermediaries from liability for third-party speech, it has not been the
free pass many of its proponents claim and its critics lament. More than
a third of the claims at issue in the cases survived a section 230
defense. Even in cases where the court dismissed the claims,
intermediaries bore liability in the form of litigation costs, and it took
courts, on average, nearly a year to issue decisions addressing an
intermediary's defense under section 230.
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INTRODUCTION
What many consider the largest public space in human history is
not public at all. Paradoxically, the Internet-a content-agnostic
communication network available to anyone with access to a
computer-contains no true "public forum."1 It embraces no public
commons upon which a citizen is free to stand on his or her virtual
soapbox and regale the public.2 It is layered on privately owned Web
sites, privately owned servers, privately owned routers, and privately
owned backbones. Without the acquiescence of these intermediaries,
the public would have no access to speak or to be heard.
Largely free of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment,
private intermediaries transport, host, and index tens of billions of
pages of content online. This is not to say, however, that these
intermediaries are free of all constraints; civil and criminal liability
may attach to the content they intermediate. It is indisputable that
some of this content is injurious and even illegal. It defames others,
violates privacy rights, discloses confidential information, infringes
copyrights, and is implicated in a number of other torts or crimes.
Not unlike intermediaries in the offline world, such as mail carriers,
libraries, and book stores, online intermediaries would be hard-
pressed to screen the deluge of online speech, and the imposition of
liability for facilitating the publication or distribution of third-party
content would likely constrain their willingness to facilitate
1. In the First Amendment context, a "public forum" includes streets, sidewalks, and parks,
which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). Because this Article's
focus is on private intermediaries, the limitations imposed on state actors by the First Amendment
are of only passing relevance. For a discussion of the First Amendment's relevance to private-
party ordering, see infra Part lI.B.
2. One of the best-known locations for public speech in the offline world is Speakers'
Comer in Hyde Park, London, which has become synonymous with free speech in a public
forum. "Officially sanctioned in 1872 by the Royal Parks and Gardens Regulation Act, Speakers'
Comer is a site for people to exercise their right of free speech. You can turn up, stand on a
makeshift platform (the simplest being a milk crate), and speak about any topic you like, provided
that your utterances do not contravene the Regulations." John Michael Roberts, The Enigma of
Free Speech: Speakers' Corner, The Geography of Governance and a Crisis of Rationality, 9
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 271, 272 (2000). Indeed, "[s]uch is the power of this symbol that the very
name, 'Speakers' Comer', resonates a populist, democratic image which today goes beyond any
immediate physical location." Id.
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continued public use.3 Moreover, any such constraints would have
profound implications for the availability of speech online,
particularly speech espousing controversial viewpoints and
disfavored subjects.'
While the Internet has vastly expanded individuals' ability to
engage in speech and has enhanced the public's capacity to hear and
to understand that speech, choke points remain. This is not a new
problem, of course. 5  Private-party structuring has long had an
influence on what speech can be communicated, but the Internet's
extensive reliance on private intermediaries makes this influence
more extensive and apparent.
Private intermediaries' pervasiveness, combined with the
extraordinary power they wield over speech, make them attractive
targets for regulators and litigants.6 Given their essential role in
facilitating online communication, intermediaries often are capable
of exercising authority over wrongdoers who are otherwise
unreachable because these wrongdoers are not capable of being
3. See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916
(2002) (noting the link between intermediary liability and censorship by intermediaries); Reinier
H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857,
892 (1984) (observing that in response to increased liability, intermediaries "will charge high risk
premiums . . . [and] may even withdraw their services entirely from small or risky firms");
Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 239, 273 (2005) ("It is well recognized that imposing liability on intermediaries
will affect the services and prices they present to their customers."); cf N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79 (1964) ("[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without
knowledge of the contents, ... he will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected
.... And the bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, for by restricting him the
public's access to reading matter would be restricted.") (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1959)).
4. Jerome Barron, in his seminal article on the power of "the press," cautioned that because
media intermediaries are primarily concerned with profitability, they shy away from unorthodox
and unpopular speech, and the "vacuum is filled with the least controversial and bland ideas."
Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1646-47 (1967).
5. As Professor Barron observed with regard to the limits intermediaries placed on speech
in the mid-sixties, "[ojur constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free
expression, a belief that the 'marketplace of ideas' is freely accessible." Id. at 1641; cf Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656-57 (1994) (noting the threat of censorship by cable
providers who control speech bottlenecks).
6. See Seth Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 11, 16 (2006). Kreimer calls Internet
intermediaries the "weak link" in the free speech chain, observing that "[e]ach intermediary may
interdict communications, or identify speakers, listeners, or other intermediaries against whom
sanctions may be directed." Id.
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identified, are beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or are simply not
amenable to legal pressure.'
But the targeting of intermediaries comes with substantial risks
both for the intermediary and for our system of free expression.
Many of these risks stem from the fact that intermediaries have a
"fragile commitment to the speech that they facilitate."8 As others
have noted, intermediaries are more susceptible to legal threats than
are primary speakers because the interests of the two groups, both
economic and instrumental, frequently diverge.' As a result,
intermediaries do not always share society's interest in ensuring a
vibrant landscape for speech and often are unwilling to act as
champions for the speech of third parties.
Mindful of the roles that intermediaries play online, Congress
acted decisively when it enacted section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act. " In deceptively simple language, section 230 states
that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider," " thereby granting operators
of Web sites and other interactive computer services broad protection
from claims based on the speech of third parties. 2
In the thirteen years since its enactment, section 230 has been
described both as the savior of free speech in the digital age and as
7. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REv. 653, 661-63 (2003).
Moreover, intermediaries make attractive targets because they often are the parties with a "deep
pocket," capable of paying a legal judgment if one is rendered. See Dan Markel, How Should
Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1476 (2009).
8. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 28. Because revenue from each marginal customer is small and
the cost of a legal defense, not to mention potential monetary sanctions, is high, it is almost
always cheaper for the intermediary to remove speech than to expend time or resources contesting
even meritless claims. See id.; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187-88, 192-93
(2004) (concluding that the threat of lawsuits discourages the distribution of copyrighted material
even when doing so would be fair use).
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L.
REv. 427, 435-36 (2009) ("The problem with the strategy of collateral censorship in the Internet
context is that it simultaneously leads to too much censorship and too little innovation. Book
publishers have a vested interest in the work of their authors, and newspapers have a vested
interest in the work of their journalists. But if A is not affiliated with B, A lacks strong incentives
to defend B's speech and every incentive to prevent lawsuits."); Kreimer, supra note 6, at 29
("Intermediaries are peculiarly susceptible to chill, for they often face cost and revenue structures
quite different from those of first-party speakers.").
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
11. Id. § 230(c)(1).
12. See id.; infra Part II.D. Section 230 has been held to preempt causes of action ranging
from discrimination under the Fair Housing Act to unfair competition. See infra Part III.B.3.
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an ill-conceived shield for scoundrels. Yet no one suggests that this
seminal piece of legislation is inconsequential. But what kind of an
impact has section 230 had on intermediaries, on those who have
been harmed by third parties online, and on speech more generally?
Not surprisingly, section 230 has attracted a great deal of attention
from scholars, 13 and has engendered considerable commentary in the
popular press. " Few scholars, however, have undertaken a
comprehensive study of the case law involving section 230, and none
have done so from a systematic, empirical perspective. 15
Instead, the primary mode of study within the legal academy has
been to focus on a few high-profile cases. 16 This has led to polarizing
debates, as commentators typically choose one set of cases to support
13. See, e.g., Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the
Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137 (2008); Susan Freiwald, Comparative
Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569 (2001); H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity:
Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369 (2008); Mark A.
Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007); Ken
S. Myers, Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communications Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 163 (2006); Matt C. Sanchez, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale
Against Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 301 (2008); Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third
Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility:
Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Brian Baxter, Tormented by Cyber-Stalker, Ropes Partner Drafts New
Legislation, AMLAW DAILY, Apr. 17, 2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/04/
ropes-gray-partner-fights-cyberstalker.html; Leslie Harris, Painting a Bulls-Eye on the First
Amendment, HUFFINGTON POST, June 12, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leslie-harris/
painting-a-bulls-eye-on-tb 214713.html; Adam Thierer & John Palfrey, Dialogue: The Future
of Online Obscenity and Social Networks, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 5, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2009/03/a-friendly-exchange-about-the-future-of-online-liability.ars.
15. The only author to have published a comprehensive summary of section 230 cases is
Ken Myers. His insightful article on section 230's application to Wikipedia includes a table
listing forty-seven cases, along with the medium of publication, the prevailing party, and, where
the plaintiff prevailed, the court's reasoning. Myers, supra note 13, at 205-08. This is not to say,
however, that non-empirical approaches are without value. Many of the articles cited herein
"pursue[] doctrinal, interpretative, and normative purposes rather than empirical ones." Jack
Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153, 153 (2002).
16. Barton Beebe calls this mode of study the "leading cases" or "usual suspects" approach:
"This anecdotal method, one essentially of connoisseurship, derives conventional wisdom about
our case law from a limited aristocracy of hand-picked opinions appearing primarily in the U.S.
Reports--or in the student casebooks." Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair
Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 553 (2008). Whether these decisions are
representative of the broad sweep of section 230 cases is not a question such an approach can
reliably answer. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41-
42 (2002) (arguing that selection bias, among other problems, makes drawing inferences about a
population of cases unreliable).
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their normative view that section 230 goes too far in privileging
intermediaries, and another set of cases to argue that section 230
strikes the proper balance between competing interests. ,7
This Article aims to ground the debate by presenting an
empirical study of section 230 cases. Part I begins by describing the
central role intermediaries play online. Part II then presents a
doctrinal overview of common law liability for intermediaries, both
online and offline, and describes how section 230 modifies these
doctrinal approaches.
Part III outlines the methodology employed in this study and
sets forth summary statistics on the judicial decisions examined,
including their distribution along the dimensions of time, venue,
legal claim, medium of publication, and intermediary role. Part III
also reports that although the number of decisions has been trending
upwards, with an especially sharp increase after 2003, the proportion
of unreversed decisions that found claim preemption under section
230 has largely held steady at 60 percent.
Part IV focuses on how judges approached the application of
section 230, identifying six areas of judicial inquiry that run
throughout the cases. Using correlation and regression analyses, Part
IV also examines how these areas of inquiry interact with each other
and with the court's ultimate determination of preemption under
section 230. Finding that most courts have coalesced around a three-
pronged test for determining whether section 230 applies, the data
nevertheless suggest that judges have been haphazard in their
approach to section 230, often ignoring important threshold
questions or assuming that certain requirements are met.
Finally, Part V discusses the study's findings and offers some
insights into how plaintiffs and defendants have fared under section
230, including an assessment of each case's viability under common
law principles in order to gain insight into how section 230 changed
the liability landscape for intermediaries. While section 230 has
largely protected intermediaries from liability for third-party speech,
it has not been the free pass many of its proponents claim and its
critics lament it to be. First, intermediaries continue to face legal
claims arising from the speech of third parties. Indeed, the data show
17. There is, of course, gradation between these poles, but much of the scholarship on
section 230 gravitates towards one position or the other.
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that plaintiffs have filed an increasing number of such cases each
year. Second, even in cases where the court dismissed the claims,
intermediaries bore their own legal costs, and it took courts nearly a
year, on average, to issue a decision addressing the intermediary's
defense under section 230.
Although section 230 set a high bar for plaintiffs to overcome,
more than a third of their claims survived preemption. Moreover, the
data showed that most plaintiffs in the cases analyzed were able to
identify and sue the original source of the content that caused them
harm. While their success rate in those suits was quite low, it was not
out of line with other studies examining defamation and tort
litigation.
I. BACKGROUND
Human societies have a long history of utilizing intermediaries
to handle communication tasks. " This intermediation involves
activities ranging from transcription to transportation. Some of the
earliest intermediaries were friends and neighbors who passed
information via word of mouth. "9 With the advent of writing and
papyrus, intermediaries began facilitating the distribution of
information through courier systems.2" The operation of modem
communication intermediaries can be traced to the late eighteenth
century, when optical telegraphs began passing messages across
Europe.21 The electric telegraph soon followed, revolutionizing the
way humans communicated and leading to what one historian has
termed the "Victorian Internet." 22
18. Black's Law Dictionary defines an "intermediary" as "[a] mediator or go-between; a
third-party negotiator." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (8th ed. 2004). For the purposes of this
analysis, an intermediary is any entity that enables the communication of information from one
party to another.
19. See generally ROBIN DUNBAR, GROOMING, GOSSIP, AND THE EVOLUTION OF
LANGUAGE (1996) (describing the importance of "gossip" in the evolution of language and
human social systems).
20. In ancient Egypt, pharaohs are believed to have used couriers to transport their decrees to
the far reaches of their territory. See IRVING FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION: SIX
INFORMATION REVOLUTIONS 14 (1997).
21. See TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE
TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY'S ON-LINE PIONEERS 11-12 (1998) (noting that
the first use of a Chappe-style optical telegraph occurred in France in 1793).
22. Id. at VII-IX. Indeed, much of the common law related to intermediary liability
discussed in Part II was developed in response to the use of the electric telegraph.
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The Internet we know today is a network of networks, consisting
of privately owned servers, routers, and backbones that communicate
using a suite of common languages. 23 These interconnected networks
facilitate a diverse array of platforms for speech, including blogs,
social networks, discussion forums, video- and photo-hosting
services, and collaboratively edited wikis. 24 Together, they have
fundamentally altered the capacity of individuals to speak and to be
heard by others. 25
This has led some observers to predict that the Internet will
inexorably bring about widespread "disintermediation," as
individuals gain the ability to communicate directly with each
other. 26 This has not been borne out. To the contrary, while the
Internet has had a profound effect on the "industrial information
economy,"2 7 we have simply exchanged one set of intermediaries
(e.g., newspaper publishers and broadcast stations) for another set of
intermediaries (e.g., Internet service providers, content hosts, and
23. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us Twice Shame
on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 131-32 (2001); Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of
the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1116 (2005). These private
intermediaries communicate via a suite of languages called Transfer Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP). See W. RICHARD STEVENS, TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED: THE PROTOCOLS 1 (1994)
("The TCP/IP protocol suite allows computers of all sizes, from many different computer
vendors, running totally different operating systems, to communicate with each other.").
24. See generally DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE
PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE 23-43 (2004) (discussing how the Internet has changed journalism).
25. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 32 (2006) (observing that, in part because of the Internet,
"[b]oth the capacity to make meaning-to encode and decode humanly meaningful statements-
and the capacity to communicate one's meaning around the world, are held by, or readily
available to, at least many hundreds of millions of users around the globe").
26. See MARK S. BONCHEK, FROM BROADCAST TO NETCAST: THE INTERNET AND THE
FLOW OF POLITICAL INFORMATION 58 (1997) (opining that "political actors are using the Internet
to connect directly with each other and bypass traditional intermediaries"); ANDREW L. SHAPIRO,
THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND
CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 55 (1999) ("Disintermediation is the somewhat ungainly
word that is used to describe this circumventing of middlemen .... The control revolution allows
us to take power from these intermediaries and put it in our own hands."); Robert Gellman,
Disintermediation and the Internet, 13 GOV'T INFO. Q. 1, 2-3 (1996) ("Because of the
capabilities of computer networks, the functions of central repository and archive are highly
vulnerable to disintermediation.").
27. BENKLER, supra note 25, at 32 ("[C]ore functionalities of processing, storage, and
communications are widely owned throughout the population of users. Together, these changes
destabilize the industrial stage of the information economy.").
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search providers). 28 In practical terms, the Internet has made the
network itself an indispensable intermediary for speech. 29
Yet the Internet has no central authority that determines what
content can transect the network, or even who can connect to the
network.3 ° This decentralized structure is intentional,3' and many
believe it has been instrumental to the Internet's widespread adoption
as a communication tool and to the rapid pace of third-party
innovation online. 32 This lack of a central point of control also has
made it possible for private intermediaries to take on a range of
communication tasks and, not unexpectedly, they have proliferated. "
28. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933,
936-38 (2008).
29. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 70 (2006). The importance of intermediaries will undoubtedly increase as
"cloud computing" becomes more prevalent. See generally Luis M. Vaquero et al., A Break in the
Clouds: Towards a Cloud Definition, 39 ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV. 50 (2009).
"Cloud computing" is associated with a new paradigm for the provision of computing
infrastructure. This paradigm shifts the location of this infrastructure to the network to reduce the
costs associated with the management of hardware and software resources." Id. at 50.
30. See INTERNET ARCHITECTURE BOARD, ARCHITECTURAL PRINCIPLES OF THE INTERNET
2-4 (Brian Carpenter ed., 1996), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1958.txt. Larry Lessig and Jonathan
Zittrain describe the architecture of the Internet as embodying an end-to-end principle that places
the intelligence of the network at the end of unintelligent conduits. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 34-35 (2001);
JONATHAN ZITFRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 105-06 (2008). The
genius of this open structure is that components in the system can be agnostic as to what they
transport and, in fact, operate with the assumption that the network infrastructure is unreliable and
changing. The assignment of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and operation of the Domain Name
System (DNS), however, are centrally managed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit chartered to administer top-level domain name policy. See
INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, PROGRESS REPORT ON PERFORMANCE OF
LANA FUNCTIONS (2000), http://www.iana.org/periodic-reports/progress-report-may-julOO.html.
31. See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 16 (1999) ("The system ... had to be
completely decentralized. That would be the only way a new person somewhere could start to use
it without asking for access from someone else. And that would be the only way the system could
scale, so that as more people used it, it wouldn't get bogged down.").
32. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet
Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 847 (2004); Jonathan Zittrain, The
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1980 (2006). Jonathan Zittrain coined the term
"generativity" to describe these attributes of the Internet. Id. "Generativity denotes a technology's
overall capacity to produce unprompted change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated
audiences." Id.
33. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 3, at 252.
COMMUNICA TIONS DECENCY A CT § 230
A. The Pervasiveness of Private Intermediaries
Given the Internet's decentralized architecture, intermediaries
play many different roles. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say
that there are as many ways to categorize intermediaries as there are
intermediaries. " Fortunately, section 230 does not distinguish
between types of intermediaries,35 so we need not set out a
comprehensive taxonomy. Instead, this part of the Article will focus
on the functions intermediaries perform when facilitating expressive
communication in order to develop a conceptual vocabulary that
permits comparison between online and offline intermediaries.
To illustrate the functions intermediaries perform, let us take as
an example an individual who wishes to upload a video she created
to YouTube. When she "publishes" her video online, a number of
steps occur, likely involving dozens of intermediaries. First, she goes
to YouTube.com to begin the upload process. Even this simple task,
however, involves a number of intermediaries. All Internet
communication is accomplished by splitting the communication into
data packets that are directed by specialized hardware known as
routers, which are operated by intermediaries throughout the
network. 36 These routers identify computers on the Internet by their
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, which typically look something like
192.0.1.123. Because human beings cannot easily remember this
34. There is no accepted taxonomy of Internet intermediaries. Although economists and
computer scientists, among others, have developed various approaches to categorizing
intermediaries, these approaches tend to group intermediaries according to categories relevant to
the researcher's narrow question of interest rather than devising a comprehensive taxonomy of
roles played by online intermediaries. See, e.g., Mitra Barun Sarkar et al., Intermediaries and
Cybermediaries: A Continuing Role for Mediating Players in the Electronic Marketplace, J.
COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM., Dec. 1995, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/voll/issue3/sarkar.html
(noting the challenge of categorizing intermediaries by function in the context of electronic
commerce).
35. See infra notes 249-251 and accompanying text. Unlike the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act (DMCA), which does not protect all Internet intermediaries and provides different levels of
immunity based on intermediary classification, see 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2006) (defining four
classes of intermediaries: conduit providers; service providers that store or cache content hosted
by another party; providers who host content posted by another party; and search engines),
section 230 extends its protections, at least as an initial matter, to any "provider or user of an
interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
36. In technical terms, the Internet comprises multiple operating layers, arranged in a vertical
hierarchy, that dictate how data is formatted, transmitted, manipulated, and displayed. See Solum
& Chung, supra note 32, at 816. when speech is communicated via the Internet, it flows, in
digital form, down from the content layer through the other layers to the physical layer, across the
physical layer in packets, and then back up through the same layers in reverse order. Id. at 816-
17.
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string of numbers, the domain name system (DNS) allows mnemonic
names to be associated with IP addresses. When an Internet user
enters one of these domain names into her web browser, for example
YouTube.com, her computer sends a request to a DNS server,
typically operated by her Internet Service Provider (ISP) or another
intermediary that maintains a lookup table associating the name with
a specific IP address. "
Once her request to sign on has been routed to YouTube, she is
ready to begin the upload process. Her video does not go directly to
YouTube, however. Instead, the video is sent from her computer to
the network run by her ISP. The ISP then sends the data constituting
the video, via multiple intermediaries that provide "peering
connections,"38 to the network owned by the ISP that services
YouTube. From there the data are sent to YouTube's servers, which
host the video for her, assuming it does not violate any of YouTube's
terms of service. The entire sequence of steps is reversed, with a
slightly different set of intermediaries, when her friend visits
YouTube to view the video.
From this simple example we can begin to group the various
intermediaries into three general classifications: (1) communication
conduits; (2) content hosts; and (3) search/application providers. "
The first category includes intermediaries that facilitate the physical
transport of data across the network. Every person who accesses the
Internet does so through an ISP, typically a telephone company,
cable company, or satellite provider. " From the user's point of view,
her ISP is the sole entity responsible for making access to content on
the Internet possible, but many other intermediaries are involved in
transporting that content and ensuring that it arrives at the right
37. This address system also relies on a number of other intermediaries to function,
including domain name registrars (DNR) that are responsible for assigning IP addresses and
associating those addresses with domain names.
38. Most large ISPs do not exchange payment for the data traffic they swap; instead, they
regard the other ISP in the transaction as a "peer." See, e.g., ZITTRAIN, supra note 30, at 33 n.50;
Paul Milgrom et al., Competitive Effects of Internet Peering Policies, in THE INTERNET
UPHEAVAL, 175-95 (Ingo Vogelsang & Benjamin M. Compaine eds., 2000).
39. There are, of course, other ways to categorize online intermediaries and many
intermediaries play more than one role. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe all of the
intermediaries that facilitate communication on the Internet. For example, financial intermediaries
(e.g., banks and credit card processors) play a critical role in the functioning of the Internet, but
are not the focus for this Article.
40. Zittrain, supra note 32, at 1993; Zittrain, supra note 7, at 664.
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT § 230
place. Some of the least visible intermediaries in this category are
backbone providers that operate solely at the transmission level and
have no direct relationship with the actors at either endpoint.4
Source and destination ISPs, on the other hand, serve-and usually
have a contractual relationship with-the end users who seek to
access content and the entities responsible for hosting it.42
Because the Internet operates without a single authority
directing traffic across the network, the various intermediaries
responsible for transporting data are left to do so in whatever manner
they see fit. Jonathan Zittrain colorfully describes the process as a
"bucket-brigade partnership in which network neighbors pass along
each other's packets for perhaps ten, twenty, or even thirty hops
between two points."43 Each of these "hops" could involve a
university server, an Internet retailer, or a backbone provider, all of
whom pass the relevant data packets along to the next stop based on
the information contained in the packet header. "
In the offline world, examples of "conduits," the first category
of intermediaries, include telephone companies with regard to voice
traffic, newspaper delivery persons, and mail carriers. Generally
speaking, the defining characteristic of conduits is that they have no
knowledge of and limited control over the contents of the speech
they intermediate. 45
The second category of intermediaries comprises content hosts.
These are intermediaries that store, cache, or otherwise provide
access to third-party content. 46 While anyone can set up a blog or
Web site on a home server, few people do. Instead, the majority of
the speech that occurs online is stored on or made available from
servers owned by private intermediaries, the largest of which are
41. While invisible to users, they are not invisible to plaintiffs. See Daniel W. Kopko,
Looking for a Crack to Break the Internet's Back: The Listen4ever Case and Backbone Provider
Liability Under the Copyright Act and the DMCA, 8 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 83, 85 (2003)
(discussing a lawsuit by record labels against the four major companies that provide the
"backbone" infrastructure of the Internet).
42. Mann & Belzley, supra note 3, at 255-56.
43. ZITTRAIN, supra note 30, at 33.
44. See John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border with
Cyberspace, 78 Miss. L.J. 241, 253 (2008)
45. See Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974); ROBERT D.
SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER & RELATED PROBLEMS § 7.3.1 (3d ed. 2007).
46. See Balkin, supra note 28, at 936-37.
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operated by well-known brand names like Google and Yahoo!. 4 7 As
a result, when an anonymous blogger covering police corruption
speaks to the world, he likely does so via a blog-hosting service such
as Blogger. 4 Groups espousing unpopular views assemble on social
networking sites such as Facebook.49 Citizen journalists publish
photos and videos via hosting sites such as Flickr and YouTube. 50
Activists organize protests using microblogs such as Twitter. " And
artists perform music and poetry in virtual worlds such as Second
Life. 52 In each of these instances, their speech is hosted by a private
intermediary that decides-subject only to the voluntary limitations
it takes on through its terms of use-when, how, and whether to
make that speech available to others. 53
In the offline world, examples of content hosts include book
stores and libraries. These intermediaries are also known as
"distributors" because they operate between primary publishers and
47. The largest Web site hosting providers in 2008 were GoDaddy Inc. and 1&1 Internet AG
with 15,086,689 and 9,616,022 hosted sites, respectively, according to a November 2008 study by
Netcraft. See Netcraft.com, Hosting Provider Switching Analysis, Nov. 5, 2008,
http://news.netcraft.com/hosting-provider-switching-dataset.
48. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or "Chilling Effects "?
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 645 (2006) (noting that "Google-provided hosting services-
including Blogger, UseNet and Google Groups archives-account for about a third of Google's
total [DMCA takedown] notices").
49. See Posting of Robert Mackey, Holocaust Deniers Gather on Facebook, to The New
York Times News Blog, (May 13, 2009), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/
13/holocaust-deniers-gather-on-facebook/.
50. Not surprisingly, these hosting sites have been the subject of frequent takedown requests
for allowing users to post material. See, e.g., David Ardia, Fox Television WFLD-TV v. Progress
Illinois, CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/fox-
television-wfld-tv-v-progress-illinois (describing takedown notice from Fox Television directed
at video posted by online news organization that embedded a television news clip).
51. See Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y. TIMES,
Jun. 16, 2009, at All (reporting that "Iranians are blogging, posting to Facebook and, most
visibly, coordinating their protests on Twitter, the messaging service").
52. See John D. Sutter, Artists Visit Virtual Second Life for Real-World Cash, CNN, Apr. 7
2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/04/07/second.life.singer/index.html ("With the recording
industry in near-shambles and the recession taking a hit on art of all kinds, some musicians, visual
artists and fashion designers have turned to another virtual frontier-Second Life-to sell CDs,
earn tips, move paintings and grow international followings.").
53. See Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, Ebooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a
First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1519, 1564 (2007); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 994.
I'll leave for others whether intermediaries should have an affirmative obligation to provide
access to certain types of speech. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 28, at 939; Barron, supra note 4, at
1641. My concern is the impact that civil liability rules have on the discretion intermediaries
exercise over the speech of third parties.
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readers. " Like conduits, content hosts play an essential role in the
distribution of speech, facilitating a speaker's broad reach and a
listener's varied choices.
The third category of intermediaries includes application service
providers and search engines. These intermediaries facilitate access
to content by, among other things, indexing it, filtering it, or
formatting it, but do not necessarily host the content themselves. "
Online examples include Google Search and spain-filtering software.
These intermediaries are of vital importance because they allow
others to find and make sense of the vast amount of information
available on the Internet and to direct their limited attention to
information that is of interest to them. 56
Search and application intermediaries have few analogs in the
offline world. Some of the closest examples include the providers of
telephone directories, stock prices, and bond ratings. Because they
lack precise real-world analogs, application service providers and
search engines do not fit neatly into the existing liability categories
that have developed under the common law. 57
B. Intermediary Control over Third-Party Speech
Because speech on the Internet transects the network as
standardized electronic bits, the technologies that make the network
function also present intermediaries with a powerful set of tools they
can use to filter and curtail speech. 58 Indeed, this is the Internet's
Achilles' heel, so to speak. For example, it would be a relatively easy
matter for content hosts to identify and remove material on their
servers because they already run software that directly interacts with
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) cmts. d & e (1977).
55. Although they often make transient copies, called "caching," in order to perform these
functions. See Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475, 482 (2009).
56. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3
(2007) (concluding that "[s]earch engines are the new linchpins of the Internet"); Kreimer, supra
note 6, at 40 (observing that "[t]he salience of Internet communication is famously sensitive to
marginal changes in availability").
57. See Grimmelmann, supra note 56, at 15 ("The set of laws potentially applicable to
search may seem bewilderingly large.").
58. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at 16 ("[Tlhe networks of the Internet involve a series of
electronic links; at each link, from user to originating computer to server to ISP to Internet
backbone and back down the chain to the end user, the state may find a potential proxy censor.
Each intermediary may interdict communications, or identify speakers, listeners, or other
intermediaries against whom sanctions may be directed."); Zittrain, supra note 7, at 656-73
(describing the control mechanism available to online intermediaries).
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the content at issue. " Conduit intermediaries face a slightly more
challenging task because their interaction with Internet
communications occurs below the content layer. 6 However,
hardware and software tools currently exist that would permit these
intermediaries to filter or block material based on, among other
things, the identity of sender or recipient and the substance of the
communications themselves.6" Search and application providers,
which have become central to how people find and make sense of
information online, can simply modify the criteria they use when
indexing information to exclude content that contains a certain word,
image, or sound, effectively rendering speakers silent and invisible to
others. 62
Albeit functional, these are blunt tools and approaches. They are
blunt in the sense that they invariably block more content than the
intermediary intended,63 and they are blunt in the sense that they are
incapable of exercising judgment. While software can identify
certain words or phrases, it cannot determine whether the speech in
fact defames others or invades their privacy, as such determinations
require contextual analysis and, in many instances, additional fact
gathering. 6 As a result, the process of assessing legal liability cannot
59. Zittrain, supra note 7, at 657; Rebecca MacKinnon, Studying Chinese Blog Censorship,
RConversation, http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2008/1 1/studying-chines.html (Nov.
28, 2008).
60. Conduit intermediaries handle the flow of communications across their networks by
interacting with data at the transport, IP, link, and physical layers. See Solun & Chung, supra
note 32, at 816.
61. See generally Steven J. Murdoch & Ross Anderson, Tools and Technology of Internet
Filtering, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 57
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008).
62. Google's efforts to placate Chinese authorities demonstrate this capability. See Edward
Wong, China Disables Some Google Functions, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A6. A court in
Argentina recently ordered Google and Yahoo! to stop linking to Web sites containing
photographs of the plaintiff, remarking that "[s]earch engines are responsible due to their
activities as Web site access facilitators." David Haskel, Computer Crime: Argentine Judge Holds
Google, Yahoo! Liable for Posting of Third Party Content, 14 BNA'S ELECTRONIC COM. & L.
REP. 1094, 1094 (Aug. 5, 2009).
63. Even if the intermediary accurately excises the speech it intends to target, it may still
make errors. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at 27 ("An ISP or search engine may mistake a family
photo album for child pornography, an AIDS prevention site for obscenity, a political
commentary for a 'true threat,' or a parody for a copyright violation.").
64. For example, speech that is substantially true cannot be defamatory, even when that
speech is highly offensive or injurious. See, e.g., Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 404 N.W.2d
765, 767-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). But see Noonan v. Staples Inc., 556 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.
2009) (finding that truthful speech on a matter of private concern can create liability if published
with actual malice). And it is not just U.S. liability standards that intermediaries need to consider.
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be effectively automated. While some intermediaries, particularly
those who can pass along to others the cost of the additional staff and
resources needed to manually review content, will continue to
facilitate the publication of potentially tortious or injurious speech,
many others will not be in a position to do so and will therefore
block or filter any speech that could arguably result in liability. 65
Furthermore, when intermediaries remove potentially injurious
speech, they often do so without providing an opportunity for the
speaker to contest the removal or blocking.66 It is costly for
intermediaries to offer dispute resolution procedures to their users. It
is far less costly to simply remove speech at the first sign of trouble
or to decline to carry controversial speech in the first place. In fact,
any increase in the baseline liability for intermediaries will impact
their willingness to facilitate potentially injurious speech.67 A
''profit-maximizing intermediary likely will choose the mechanism
that is least costly, rather than the one that preserves the most
speech." 6
Moreover, even if intermediaries were capable of determining
what speech is tortious or unlawful, it is unlikely that they would be
able to adequately weigh or capture the full social value of the
speech they are poised to interdict. "9 Accordingly, "[i]f we impose
The often inconsistent legal rules of other countries make the task of determining whether speech
is tortious or illegal even more difficult. See, e.g., Pakistan: Blasphemy Case over Cartoons
Registered, ASIA MEDIA, Apr. 26, 2006, http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article-south
asia.asp?parentid=44274 (reporting on criminal action lodged against Hotmail, Yahoo!, and
Google over cartoons caricaturing the Prophet Muhammad).
65. See Kraakman, supra note 3, at 891-92 ("[Flirms will ... pay for the risk of additional
liability in the familiar ways. If outside gatekeepers cannot shift their liability risks, they will
charge high risk premiums."). Intermediaries that cannot pass these costs along to others will
either go out of business or impose tight restrictions on the content they intermediate, "effectively
lock[ing] down the Internet." Lemley, supra note 13, at 111.
66. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at 28; Malla Pollack, The Right to Know? Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause,
and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 109 (1999). In the context of
copyright infringement claims, however, the DMCA provides an incentive for hosting services to
give notice to their subscribers when they remove content by providing a safe harbor against
claims by the user if the content host improperly removes the content or disables access. See 17
U.S.C. § 512(g) (2006).
67. See Kraakman, supra note 3, at 892; Mann & Belzley, supra note 3, at 273.
68. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 31.
69. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 988-89 (2005); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 279-80 (2007); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S.
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the full social costs of harm from third-party postings on
intermediaries, but they cannot capture the full social benefits of
those postings, they will respond by inefficiently restricting the uses
that third parties can make of the Internet." 70 We would therefore
expect to see excessive curtailment of speech, as risk-averse
intermediaries filter and block all but the most banal speech. 71 This
likely would leave us with something akin to what cable television
provides: content from a short list of preapproved providers. 72
II. DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW
Although intermediaries, by definition, are not primary
malfeasors, 73 they are not invisible to the law. Civil and criminal
rules impose limited forms of secondary liability on all
intermediaries. While the distinction between primary and
CAL. L. REv. 53, 73 (2003); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 281-
90 (2004); Mann & Belzley, supra note 3, at 273-74.
70. Lemley, supra note 13, at 112.
71. See Hamdani, supra note 3, at 76 ("The increase in fees associated with gatekeeper
liability first drives out law-abiding clients for whom the value of the relevant market is relatively
low."); Mann & Belzley, supra note 3, at 274 ("[A] risk always exists that imposing additional
burdens on intermediaries will chill the provision of valuable goods and services. That will be
especially problematic in cases where considerable risk of chilling legal conduct that is adjacent
to the targeted conduct exists."), One counterargument is that customer departure provides a
hedge against censorship and an incentive for intermediaries to position themselves as more
protective of speech. Such claims should be tempered by the fact that switching ISPs, hosting
providers, and e-mail services is often difficult, and many Americans do not have a choice when
it comes to their ISP, especially with regard to broadband providers. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at
34-36.
72. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656-57 (1994). Recognizing the
threat of censorship by cable providers, the Court cautioned:
[S]imply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable
operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming it chooses
to exclude. A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the voice
of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.
The potential for abuse of this private power over a central avenue of communication
cannot be overlooked.
Id.
73. See Kraakman, supra note 3, at 889.
74. Secondary liability encompasses two distinct concepts: vicarious and contributory
liability. vicarious liability, also called respondeat superior, arises under the common law
doctrine of agency and places responsibility on a superior for the acts of subordinates. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). Contributory liability, a concept that arose in
the intellectual property context, applies when a party "with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Gershwin Publ'g
v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). In the criminal context, aiding-
and-abetting and conspiracy may also create secondary liability for intermediaries. Under
secondary liability doctrines, intermediaries generally do not take on an affirmative duty to act or
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secondary liability can often be fluid, primary liability in the speech
context typically attaches to those who are the primary speakers or
actors; 75 others who may have had some nexus to the wrongful acts,
but who are not the actual speakers or actors, are governed by
secondary liability principles. Intermediaries may fulfill this nexus
by providing access to the content, facilitating its transport or receipt,
or providing the instrumentalities that enable others to speak or act.
This part of the Article outlines the most common forms of
speech-based liability that intermediaries face and describes how
section 230 modifies these doctrinal approaches.
A. Overview of Common Law
Liability for Intermediaries
Internet intermediaries face an array of potential legal claims,
both civil and criminal, arising from the content and actions of third
parties. This may include liability under intellectual property laws,
anti-discrimination laws, and state tort laws. At the same time, they
also benefit from various statutory protections that create what could
best be described as a patchwork of liability.76 Not surprisingly,
determining the liability intermediaries may face with regard to the
online content and actions of third parties can be a daunting
proposition.
Fortunately, we can short-circuit some of this difficulty because
section 230 expressly excludes intellectual property law, federal
criminal law, and communications privacy law from its coverage. "
As a result, and in keeping with this Article's focus on section 230's
impact on speech, the present discussion will primarily address the
liability that intermediaries face with regard to speech-based torts,
such as defamation, invasion of privacy, misrepresentation, and
negligence.
Developing an understanding of these common law torts will
allow us to establish a baseline of liability from which section 230's
to prevent tortious or illegal conduct, but only a duty not to facilitate known wrongdoing. See
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 889.
75. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REv. 309, 389-90 (2008).
76. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2)(B)-(C) (2006); Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(D)(ii) (2006); Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006).
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changes can be measured. Indeed, apart from section 230's
protections and the constitutional limitations imposed by the
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 7' and its progeny,
liability for defamation and other speech-based harms is still dictated
largely by the common law doctrines discussed in this section of the
Article. While a number of states have created statutory causes of
action mirroring the common law,79 and others have passed
retraction statutes80 and statutes to protect against strategic lawsuits
against public participation ("SLAPP suits"),"' these legislative
efforts have not significantly altered the standard of liability primary
speakers and intermediaries face.
1. Primary Speaker Liability
Speech-based harms invariably involve a speaker, the original
source of the injurious information, who bears direct liability as the
"primary speaker. ' 82 This liability can arise under a number of
different legal theories. The most frequently occurring cause of
action in the section 230 case law is defamation, including its
siblings: libel, slander, and disparagement. 83 As a product of state
law, the precise contours of these reputational torts vary from state to
state. Generally speaking, however, persons or entities will face
liability for defamation if (1) they make a false and defamatory
statement concerning another; (2) they communicate that statement
to a third party; (3) they evidence fault amounting to at least
negligence; and (4) the statement is either actionable irrespective of
special harm (per se) or there is proof of special harm caused by the
publication (per quod). 4 This summary of the elements of a claim
78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 44-46 (West 2009) (defining libel and slander).
80. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 93 (West 2009).
81. Strategic lawsuits against public participation ("SLAPP suits") are lawsuits "without
substantial merit brought against individuals or groups with the intention of 'silencing [the]
opponents, or at least ... diverting their resources."' Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-SLAPP
Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
801, 802 (2000). More than 26 states have passed laws that allow a defendant to dismiss these
lawsuits at an early stage in the litigation. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West
2009); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/15 (2009).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
83. Defamation claims, including libel, slander, trade libel, and disparagement, occurred in
50.5% of the decisions. See infra Part lI.B.3.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
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for defamation is deceptively simple; entire treatises have been
devoted to debating the intricacies of each requirement. 8
The sin qua non of defamation is a false statement of fact.
Accordingly, statements of opinion typically cannot support a cause
of action for defamation, even if they are outrageous or widely off
the mark. 86 A number of other common law privileges have also
developed over the years to provide speakers and publishers with
additional breathing room, including the fair report privilege, the
wire service defense, and the neutral reportage privilege, each of
which protects the republication of certain unverified statements. 87
Defamation law also does not permit recovery for the exposure
of private but truthful information, 88 or for false communications that
may hurt an individual's feelings but do not cause reputational harm.
The four privacy torts-false light, intrusion into seclusion,
publication of private facts, and misappropriation of one's name or
likeness-developed to provide a remedy in such situations. 89 One of
the elements distinguishing a publication of private facts claim from
a defamation claim is that truth is not a defense; instead, truth is an
essential element of the tort.9 ° An individual has no claim for
publication of private facts if the publication is false. 9' In addition,
the disclosed information must be private. 9 Anything that occurs in
85. One such debated element is what constitutes a "defamatory statement." The gravamen
of defamation is injury to reputation. Although states have different definitions for what is
defamatory, there is universal agreement that speech that is merely unflattering, annoying,
irksome, embarrassing, or simply hurts the plaintiff's feelings is not actionable. SACK, supra note
45, § 2.4.1. For example, New York defines a defamatory publication as one that "tends to
,expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion
of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in
society."' Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted).
86. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990); Leidholdt v. L.F.P.
Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. For an excellent summary of these defenses and their potential application to online
intermediaries, see Sanchez, supra note 13, at 305-08.
88. See, e.g., Campanelli v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 896 (Ct. App.
1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977). But see Noonan v. Staples, Inc., 556
F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that truthful speech on a matter of private concern can create
liability under Massachusetts law if published with actual malice).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
90. See id. § 652D.
91. See, e.g., Fellows v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 234, 242 (1986).
92. See, e.g., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 808 (1998).
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a public place is by definition not private and cannot be the subject
of a publication of private facts claim. "
As to other claims such as tortious interference,9 4 intentional
infliction of emotional distress,95 and negligence, courts generally
require that when these claims are based on injurious speech, the
plaintiff must surmount the same constitutional and common law
protections applicable to defamation claims,96 regardless of the label
selected by the plaintiff for his or her claim. 17
As this brief overview demonstrates, an essential element of
each tort is publication,98 typically defined as communication to a
third party other than the plaintiff. 99 Publication need not involve the
help of others, but if it does, those who serve as intermediaries face
three potential types of liability for facilitating the speech: (1)
publisher liability; (2) distributor liability; and (3) conduit liability.
93. Rare exceptions to this rule have been made in situations where a private person has
been caught in a very embarrassing event outside of her control. See Daily Times Democrat v.
Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964) (allowing a woman to recover for a published picture of her
emerging from a fun house where a fan had blown up her skirt without her knowledge). But many
courts have refused to recognize an exception in similar contexts. See, e.g., Neff v. Time, 406 F.
Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976); McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
App. 1991).
94. Tortious interference, sometimes described as tortious interference with contract or
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, is not recognized in every state. For
those states that do recognize such claims, the elements generally entail (1) the existence of
contractual or business relations with a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of such relations;
(3) defendant's intentional procurement of breach or interference; and (4) damages caused by the
breach or interference. See, e.g., Int'l Minerals & Res., S.A. v. Pappas, 96 F.3d 586, 595 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing Jews for Jesus Inc. v. Jewish Cmty. Relations Council, 968 F.2d 286, 292 (2d Cir.
1992)).
95. To make out a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff generally
must prove: "(1) that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct (2) that
intentionally or recklessly (3) caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff." Cunningham v.
United Nat'l Bank of Wash., 710 F. Supp. 861, 863 (D.D.C. 1989) (citing Ridgewells Caterer,
Inc. v. Nelson, 688 F. Supp 760, 764 (D.D.C. 1988)).
96. See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1998)
(negligence); Idema v. Wager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (intentional infliction
claim); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 214 N.W. 754, 756-57 (Minn. 1927) (Stone, J.,
dissenting) (tortious interference).
97. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 532 F.3d 1007,
1015 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "creative pleading does not change the analysis of a defamation-
based claim or applicable privileges").
98. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which is not discussed in the main text but is
nevertheless one of the privacy torts, does not require publication in order to be actionable. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 550-51 (7th Cir. 2009).
99. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines publication for purposes of defamation law
as "communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person defamed."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (1977).
Winter 2010] COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT § 230 397
2. Publisher Liability
Under standard common law principles, a person who publishes
a statement by another bears the same liability for the statement as if
he or she had initially created it. 0 Because they cooperate actively
in the publication, "primary publishers," as they are sometimes
called, are held to a standard of liability comparable to that of
primary speakers. "' Thus, a book publisher or a newspaper publisher
can be held liable for anything that appears within the pages of its
publications. Publisher liability attaches even if the publisher
attributes the statement at issue to the original author. The theory
behind this liability is that a publisher has the knowledge,
opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the content
of its publications. 102
Whether they in fact have this knowledge and ability to exercise
editorial control over the contents of their publications is irrelevant
under common law principles. Publishers are held liable for injurious
statements contained in their works even absent proof that they had
specific knowledge of the statements at issue because of an assumed
duty to be aware of what they publish. 103 As a result, publisher
liability is, in practical terms, coterminous with primary speaker
liability.
3. Distributor Liability
Distributor liability is far more limited. Newsstands, bookstores,
and libraries are generally not held liable for the content they
100. Id. § 578; see also Harris v. Minvielle, 19 So. 925, 928 (La. 1896) (stating that
"talebearers are as bad as talemakers"). In fact, each time a defamatory statement is
comimunicated by a new person or entity, a new publication occurs, creating a separate basis of
tort liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b (1977); see also Dixson v.
Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (stating that a "republication of false
defamatory statements is as much a tort as the original publication").
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581 cmt. g (1977).
102. See id. § 581 cmt. c (1977); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 113, at 810 (5th ed. 1984); Loftus E. Becker Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin
Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CONN. L. REv. 203, 222 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1119 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding magazine liable for negligently publishing an advertisement that created an
unreasonable risk of violent criminal activity); Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publ'g Co., 323
N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (1971) (finding newspaper liable for negligence for publishing
advertisement containing erroneous telephone number resulting in plaintiff being deluged with
sexually oriented calls). Since the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), some proof of fault must be shown to establish liability. See infra notes
142-56 and accompanying text.
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distribute unless they know or have reason to know of its tortious or
illegal nature. " Moreover, a distributor, such as a bookseller,
is under no duty to examine the various publications that he
offers for sale to ascertain whether they contain any
defamatory items. Unless there are special circumstances
that should warn the dealer that a particular publication is
defamatory, he is under no duty to ascertain its innocent or
defamatory character. 105
However, once a distributor has knowledge of the tortious nature
of the material or communications within its possession or control, it
must stop making the material available to others or face liability for
its continued publication. 106 This knowledge can be actual, as in the
case of material that is defamatory on its face, or inferred, as may be
the case when "a particular author or a particular publisher has
frequently published notoriously sensational or scandalous" material
in the past. 10
The key distinction in the common law between a publisher and
distributor is that a publisher inherently has knowledge of the content
it is publishing, while a distributor does not. As a result, the law does
not impose liability on distributors unless they have knowledge or
reason to know that information they are distributing is tortious or
unlawful.
4. Conduit Liability
In important respects, conduit liability mirrors distributor
liability. That is, there can be no liability imposed on conduits in the
absence of knowledge and fault. 108 However, intermediaries that are
104. See Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (1977). Cases against bookstores and libraries are
exceedingly rare; indeed, "no one seems to have sued a library for defamation in this century."
Becker Jr., supra note 102, at 227 (noting that "no American appears ever to have recovered for
defamation from a bookseller or distributor not controlled by the primary publisher").
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) cmt. d (1977); see also Lerman v. Flynt
Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that a distributor cannot be held liable "for
false and defamatory matter" without "adequate proof of fault").
106. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977) ("One who intentionally and
unreasonably fails to remove defamatory matter that he knows to be exhibited on land or chattels
in his possession or under his control is subject to liability for its continued publication.").
107. Id. § 581 cmt. e.
108. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 727, 729 (D. Wyo. 1986)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ("[Olne who only delivers or transmits defamatory
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"under a duty to the public to accept and transmit messages, stand[]
on a different footing from the other persons providing [the] means
of publication." 109 For those intermediaries, knowledge alone is
insufficient to establish liability. 110 As described in the comments to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a conduit intermediary
is not required to make inquiry or investigation as to the
circumstances and the reasons or purposes for which its
service is demanded. The necessity of prompt transmission
of messages precludes the inquiry. Therefore, the public
utility is privileged to accept and transmit an obviously
defamatory message . . . .The telegraph company may
assume that the sender is privileged until it has some
sufficient affirmative reason to know the contrary. 11
O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 112 illustrates the
policies animating the common law's special treatment of
conduits. 113 In O'Brien, the First Circuit stated that the immunity
provided to telegraph companies "must be broad enough to enable
the company to render its public service efficiently and with
dispatch. Speed is the essence of the service." I4 Noting that the
defendant had handled more than 70,000 messages on the day in
question, the court reasoned:
If the telegraph companies are to handle such a volume of
business expeditiously, it is obvious that their agents cannot
spend much time pondering the contents of the messages
material published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or had reason
to know of its defamatory character.")).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612 cmt. g (1977). According to the Restatement:
A public utility under a duty to transmit messages is privileged to do so, even though it
knows the message to be false and defamatory, unless
(a) the sender of the message is not privileged to send it, and
(b) the agent who transmits the message knows or has reason to know that the sender is
not privileged to publish it.
Id. § 612 (2).
110. The protection for a "public utility under a duty to transmit messages," id. § 612(2), is
expressly applicable to "common carriers," which include "any person engaged as a common
carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio," 47 U.S.C. § 153(10)
(2006); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (defining common carriers based on function).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612 cmt. g (1977).
112. 113 F.2d 539 (lst Cir. 1940).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 541.
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with a view to determining whether they bear a defamatory
meaning, and if so, whether the sender might nevertheless
be privileged. "'
The rationale behind this special treatment is that it would be
impractical, if not impossible, for intermediaries serving as conduits
to review everything they transmit; as a result, imposition of liability
would lead them to engage in excessive self-censorship. 116 This
protection enshrines the hoary principle that the law does not hold
the messenger responsible for the contents of the message. In
practical terms, conduits almost never face liability for third-party
speech. 117
This is not to say that it is easy to recognize which
intermediaries should be treated as conduits and which should be
treated as distributors. The courts struggled for years over what
standard of liability to apply to telegraph companies that transmitted
defamatory messages, eventually settling on the standard codified in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts quoted above. 118 Examples of
intermediaries that enjoy the protection afforded to conduits include
telegraph companies and telephone companies carrying voice
traffic. 19 Intermediaries that transmit the communications of others
but are not classified as "public utilit[ies] under a duty to
transmit," 120 are not entitled to this additional level of protection.
115. [d. at 542.
116. See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, 137 (4th Cir. 1950); Auvil v. CBS 60
Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 932 (E.D. Wash. 1992).
117. See Anderson v. New York Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974) (finding
telephone company not liable for a user's defamatory answering machine message even when the
telephone company knew about the defamatory statements); Sack, supra note 45, § 7.3.1.
118. See Finley P. Maxson, A Pothole on the Information Superhighway: BBS Operator
Liability for Defamatory Statements, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 673, 676 & n.12 (1997) (noting that it
was not until 1950, in W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lesesne, 182 F.2d 135, that the courts settled on a
liability standard for telegraph services).
119. For the most part, ISPs have not been classified as common carriers. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 993-96 (2005); In re Appropriate
Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 F.C.C.R.
5901, 5914 (2007) (declaratory ruling); Anthony E. Verona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest
Standard, 61 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 91 (2009). But see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of
an Antitrust Dispute: An Institutional Perspective on the Net Neutrality Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 19, 46-49 (suggesting that the FCC has authority to impose common carrier-
type non-discrimination requirements on ISPs under its Title I authority).
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 612(2) (1977).
Winter 2010] COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT § 230 401
Instead, their liability rests on the "know or have reason to know"
standard applicable to distributors. 2'
Before we examine how section 230 modifies these common
law approaches to intermediary liability, one final set of concepts
must be added to the mix: the constitutional limitations imposed by
the First Amendment.
B. First Amendment Limitations
on Intermediary Liability
The Supreme Court has not been silent with regard to the impact
civil and criminal sanctions directed at intermediaries can have on
First Amendment rights. In a series of cases decided in the 1950s and
1960s, the Court laid out the constitutional framework for evaluating
the censorial impact legal sanctions could have on intermediaries. ,22
As Seth Kreimer observes about the Court's evolving view of
intermediaries, "[t]hese doctrines continue to frame the rights of
litigants in modem litigation over efforts to chill weak links in the
chain of Internet communications." 123
In two cases involving booksellers, the Court made clear that the
First Amendment does not countenance strict liability imposed on
intermediaries and that First Amendment protections embrace the
distribution of speech as well as its initial publication. In Smith v.
California, 124 the Court was faced with a statute that made it illegal
for the operators of bookstores to have an obscene book on their
shelves, whether they knew the book was obscene or not. 125 In
121. See supra Part II.A.3.
122. Rejecting the claim that the First Amendment is implicated only when the state itself
imposes criminal sanctions, the Court stated in Bates v. City of Little Rock that the Constitution's
protections for speech and association "are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal
attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference." 361 U.S. 516, 523
(1960) (invalidating demand for NAACP's membership list). By the middle of the decade, the
Court also allowed speakers to challenge the impact of restrictions on intermediaries, see Bantam
Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963), and acknowledged that the First Amendment
extended to listeners as well, see Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (indicating that "the protection afforded is to the communication, to its
source and to its recipients both"); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965)
("The Act sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the
addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail .... This amounts in our
judgment to an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee's First Amendment rights.").
123. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 51.
124. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
125. Id. at 149.
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invalidating the statute on First Amendment grounds, the Court held
that an obscenity statute that did not require scienter on the part of
those who distributed such material had the "collateral effect of
inhibiting the freedom of expression" by placing the burden on such
distributors to continually inspect the contents of their inventory. 26
Justice William J. Brennan, writing for the Court, noted the
pernicious effect that such a law would have when applied to
intermediaries: "The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the
State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less
virulent for being privately administered." 127
In a second bookseller case, Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 128
the Court invalidated the McCarthy-esque practices of the Rhode
Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, which notified
distributors that certain books and magazines had been found by the
Commission to be objectionable for sale or display to minors. 29
While the Commission had no enforcement powers, the Court noted
that "[t]hese acts and practices directly and designedly stopped the
circulation of publications in many parts of Rhode Island," 130 which
had the effect of suppressing speech by condemning intermediaries
that distributed the targeted books. 131 Recognizing that the First
Amendment's protections would be meaningless if speech could not
be heard by others, Justice Brennan instructed that "[t]he
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the
circulation of books as well as their publication." "3
One of the most important and widely cited cases involving the
First Amendment's protections for speech, New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 133 shortly followed the bookseller cases. In Sullivan, the
Court again addressed the danger of censorship imposed by
126. Id. at 151-53; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) ("As with
obscenity laws, criminal responsibility [for child pornography] may not be imposed without some
element of scienter on the part of the defendant."); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 492
(1962) (rejecting "the power of the Post Office to bar a magazine from the mails, if exercised
without proof of the publisher's knowledge of the character of the advertisements included in the
magazine").
127. Smith, 361 U.S. at 153-54.
128. 372 U.S. 58, 72 (1963).
129. See id.
130. Id. at 68.
131. Id. at 68-69.
132. See id. at65 n.6.
133. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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intermediaries. "' Although the factual setting of the case is often
overlooked by commentators, 131 Sullivan involved The New York
Times Company acting as an intermediary with regard to a paid
editorial advertisement submitted by the "Committee to Defend
Martin Luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South." 136
Not unlike present-day intermediaries, the New York Times
republished the advertorial after conducting only minimal fact-
checking. 13
Citing his prior opinions in Smith and Bantam Books, Justice
Brennan reiterated that the First Amendment's protections extend to
intermediaries:
Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from
carrying "editorial advertisements" of this type, and so
might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves
have access to publishing facilities-who wish to exercise
their freedom of speech even though they are not members
of the press. "'
To hold otherwise, he reasoned, would result in "self-
censorship" by intermediaries and would "shackle the First
Amendment in its attempt to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources."' 139
The Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan also addressed the
question of whether a party, acting as either a primary speaker or an
intermediary, could be found liable for defamation without proof of
134. Id. at 295.
135. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1007 (observing that "Sullivan has not generally been
understood as a case about intermediary liability").
136. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257.
137. See id. at 260-61 ("The manager of the Advertising Acceptability Department testified
that ... [n]either he nor anyone else at the Times made an effort to confirm the accuracy of the
advertisement, either by checking it against recent Times news stories relating to some of the
described events or by any other means.").
138. Id. at266.
139. Id. (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). The majority also
rejected the claim that, because the case involved a civil lawsuit, there was no state action. See id.
at 265 ("It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law
only, though supplemented by statute.").
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fault. 140 The Court held that the First Amendment required that a
public official seeking damages for defamatory speech must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant published the
challenged statements with "actual malice." "'  Distinguishing
common law malice, the Court stated that a defendant publishes with
actual malice when it publishes a defamatory statement knowing that
it is false, or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. 42 In
making this determination, the Court analyzed what The New York
Times Company knew about the truth of the statements at issue, not
what the individual author of the advertisement knew. 143
Courts have applied the heightened liability standards imposed
in defamation claims to other speech-based torts as well. For
example, given the similarity between defamation and false light
claims, courts concerned with plaintiffs doing an end-run around the
fault requirements of Sullivan require the same level of fault in a
false light claim as would be required for a defamation claim. "' The
same holds true for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims
and tortious interference claims when such claims involve speech
directed to others. 145
Intermediaries also enjoy a First Amendment privilege to
publish and distribute truthful speech on matters of public concern.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper, 146 the Supreme Court rejected the imposition
of civil liability on a radio commentator who had broadcast portions
of an illegally intercepted cell phone conversation between union
140. See id at 285-88. At the time, a defendant could be held strictly liable for any false
defamatory statement under the common law. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 n.4
(1979).
141. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
142. Id. The actual malice inquiry is a subjective one; there must be sufficient evidence that
the defendant "in fact" entertained serious doubts about the veracity of the publication. St. Amant
v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The Supreme Court has made clear that this is not
measured by what a reasonably prudent man would have published or would have investigated
before publishing; even an "extreme departure" from professional publishing standards does not
establish actual malice. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989).
143. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 1007. The Court's reasoning in Sullivan has consistently
served as the basis for rejecting liability for defamation without proof of fault. See, e.g.,
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448,
463 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
144. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967); SACK, supra note 45, § 12.3.
145. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim); Blatty v. N. Y. Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 1044-45 (1986) (tortious
interference claim).
146. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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leaders discussing the need to "blow off [the] front porches" of
public officials negotiating with the union. 147 The statute at issue
imposed liability on any person who disclosed information they
knew or had reason to know was the result of illegal interception. 148
Noting that "[a]s a general matter, 'state action to punish the
publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards,' 149 the Court held that the act of publishing information
provided by an anonymous third party was constitutionally
privileged, instructing legislatures and courts that "[t]he normal
method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate
punishment on the person who engages in it." 150
The Court in Bartnicki, however, was careful to limit its holding
to truthful speech on matters of public concern. 151 The Court has not
yet addressed whether the publication of truthful information on
matters of purely private concern enjoys the same protection.
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that the First Amendment
plays a role in limiting the scope of claims seeking recovery for the
publication of private facts. 152 In addition, the Court has expressed
concern that it is improper for any court to determine what is
newsworthy, 153 particularly when the media has made a contrary
determination. 154
The requirement that plaintiffs prove falsity to recover for
reputational injuries and that defendants must evidence fault before
either civil or criminal liability may be imposed, make it feasible for
147. Id. at519.
148. Id. at 523-24.
149. Id. at 527; see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) ("[W]here a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .. "); N.Y.
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to enjoin publication
of Pentagon Papers).
150. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
151. Id. at 533-34 (leaving open "disclosures of... information of purely private concern");
id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the narrowness of the Court's holding, the
"unusual public concern" of the speech at issue, and the need to balance "speech-restricting and
speech-enhancing consequences").
152. For example, information that is a matter of public record cannot be the basis for a claim
under this tort. See, e.g., Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 524 (holding that the accurate identification of a
rape victim's name that was inadvertently revealed in a sheriffs press office was protected under
the First Amendment).
153. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
154. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484-85 (Cal. 1998).
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intermediaries to rely in good faith on the publication decisions of
others. But it may even be the case that the First Amendment
requires a higher standard than "know or have reason to know" for
online intermediaries that facilitate the speech of others. ' However,
because Congress stepped in and said in section 230 that "[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider," 56 the Supreme Court has not yet had
occasion to answer this question.
C. The Early Internet Speech Cases
Not surprisingly, the first Internet intermediaries to be sued
based on the speech of third parties argued that they were merely
distributors, and not publishers, of the content on their Web sites.
The first of these cases was Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. 157 A
subsidiary of H&R Block, CompuServe, Inc. ("CompuServe") was
one of the first national online service providers, with more than
800,000 subscribers at the time of the lawsuit. 158 CompuServe
developed CompuServe Information Service, which provided
subscribers with access to over 150 specialty electronic "forums,"
consisting of electronic bulletin boards, interactive online
conferences, and topical databases. 159 Many of these forums were
provided by third parties who agreed to editorial and technical
standards set by CompuServe. 160
One such forum run by a third party regularly published a
newsletter called "Rumorville, U.S.A.," which included reports about
broadcast journalism and journalists. ,61 The court noted that on
several occasions in April 1990, Rumorville carried items about the
155. See Floyd Abrams, First Amendment Postcards from the Edge of Cyberspace, 11 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 693, 704 (1996) ("It seems to me that a far more protective standard
is needed than 'reason to know;' something like 'knowing,' more like 'actual knowledge.' It does
not now exist as a matter of common law.").
156. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). Section 230 further provides that "[n]o cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent
with this section." Id. § 230(e)(3).
157. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
158. See Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel, and the First Amendment, 11 COMP.
L.J. 555, 577 (1992).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 137.
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plaintiffs, Cubby, Inc., and Robert Blanchard, that were published in
the CompuServe forum. 162
CompuServe did not dispute that the statements were
defamatory. 163 Instead, it argued that it should be treated like a
distributor because it did not review the contents of the forum before
it appeared on the site. "6 The court agreed. Relying in large part on
the reasoning in Smith v. California, Judge Peter Leisure held that
CompuServe was a distributor and could not be held liable for
defamatory statements in its forum unless the plaintiff could prove
that CompuServe knew or had reason to know of the defamatory
content at the time it distributed the information to its subscribers. 165
The Court seemed to take two factors into account in finding
that CompuServe was a distributor: (1) CompuServe's contract with
the third-party forum manager gave CompuServe no editorial control
over the contents of the forum at issue; 166 and (2) CompuServe had a
"short time frame within which [it] was obliged to load the presented
forum onto its service." 6' Judge Leisure explained:
A computerized database is the functional equivalent of a
more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent
application of a lower standard of liability to an electronic
news distributor such as CompuServe than that which is
applied to a public library, bookstore or newsstand would
impose an undue burden on the free flow of information. 168
Four years later, a New York state court came to the opposite
conclusion when faced with an online service provider that held itself
out as a family-friendly computer network. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co., 169 an investment banking firm sued Prodigy
162. See id. at 138. Rumorville included a statement saying that a competing news service run
by the plaintiffs had "gained access to information first published by Rumorville 'through some
back door'; a statement that Blanchard was 'bounced' from his previous employer, WABC; and a




166. See id. at 139-41.
167. Cutrera, supra note 158, at 578. Jonathan Zittrain opines that "the court credited-
wrongly, as a factual matter-that no pre-screening of uploaded materials was possible within
CompuServe's forums, making the service a passive conduit." Jonathan Zittrain, A History Of
Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 258 (2006).
168. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. at 140.
169. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
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Services Co. ("Prodigy"), another large national online service
provider with thousands of users, for allegedly defamatory
anonymous postings on its "Money Talk" bulletin board, a forum for
the discussion of investments and financial information. 170
In their motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs
argued that the moderator of "Money Talk," although an independent
third party, was an agent of Prodigy for the purposes of imputing the
moderator's knowledge of the statements at issue to Prodigy. 171
While the court stated that it agreed with the reasoning in
CompuServe, it held that, because Prodigy was exercising editorial
control over the moderator and was using a software screening
program to filter content, Prodigy was acting more like a publisher
than a distributor and therefore was responsible for all of the content
in the forum. 172
Judge Stuart Ain seems to have "anticipated the firestorm" that
would follow the Stratton Oakmont decision. 173 In an effort to stave
off criticism, Judge Ain wrote that those who claim that imposing
liability will compel all computer networks to abdicate control of
their bulletin boards "incorrectly presume[] that the market will
refuse to compensate a network for its increased control and the
resulting increased exposure." 171 Offering a bit of unsolicited advice
to the operators of Prodigy, he nevertheless suggested that they
might want to structure their operations to become more passive in
order to avoid liability in the future. 175
The perverse upshot of the Stratton Oakmont decision was that
any online service provider who made an effort to restrict or edit
user-submitted content, even for purposes of ensuring a family-
170. See id. at *1.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *3-*5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977), which states, inter
alia, that "one who repeats or otherwise republishes a libel is subject to liability as if he had
originally published it").
173. Schruers, supra note 13, at 211.
174. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5. "In fact, Stratton Oakmont itself may have
ultimately doubted the wisdom of construing ISPs as publishers of third party content." Schruers,
supra note 13, at 211. The plaintiff dropped its $200 million claim against Prodigy in exchange
for an apology, "[c]iting the 'best interests of the parties as well as the on-line and interactive
services industries."' Peter H. Lewis, After Apology From Prodigy, Firm Drops Suit, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1995, at Dl.
175. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 ("Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other
computer networks that make no such choice.").
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friendly environment, faced a much higher risk of liability if it failed
to eliminate all tortious material than if it simply did not try to
control or edit the content of third parties at all. As Judge Ain
anticipated, the decision in Stratton Oakmont created quite an uproar.
D. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
Some scholars have suggested that the protections for
intermediaries contained in section 230 slipped in unnoticed, much
like a thief in the night. 176 This is not entirely true. While Congress's
clear intent in passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA) 177 was to protect children from harmful material on the
Internet, the legislative history associated with the amendment that
ultimately became section 230 demonstrates that Congress was also
responding to Internet service providers who were voicing growing
concern about the liability they faced for third-party speech on their
services.
1. Legislative History of Section 230
A detailed account of the legislative history of the CDA is
beyond the scope of this Article and is available elsewhere. 178
Instead, this section of the Article focuses on the surprisingly short
legislative path traveled by the provisions that became section 230.
On February 1, 1995, Senator James Exon, whose earlier
attempt to legislate obscenity on the Internet had failed, 17 proposed
legislation that would become part of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 18 the most extensive overhaul of the venerable
telecommunications law since it was first enacted in 1934. Senator
Exon sought to achieve his purpose by vesting increased authority in
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and proclaimed at
the time: "[T]he information superhighway should not become a red
176. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 13, at 102 (stating that section 230 "arose largely by
accident").
177. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133
(1996).
178. For a thorough review of the CDA's legislative history, see Robert Cannon, The
Legislative History of Senator Exon 's Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on
the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996).
179. In July 1994, Senator Exon had proposed a stand-alone law intended to "modernize"
obscenity regulation "for the digital world." 140 CONG. REc. S9746 (daily ed. July 26, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Exon).
180. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
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light district. This legislation will keep that from happening and
extend the standards of decency which have protected telephone
users to new telecommunications devices." 181
Neither Senator Exon's first bill nor his second bill contained
any language resembling section 230. In fact, the provisions that
ultimately became section 230 were introduced as part of a
competing piece of legislation sponsored by Representatives
Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden, and called the Online Family
Empowerment Amendment (the "Cox/Wyden Amendment"). '82 The
Cox/Wyden Amendment had the dual purpose of overruling the
Stratton Oakmont decision and encouraging private efforts to deal
with Internet indecency. 113 Cox and Wyden made their policy goals
clear, adding language to the legislation that stated, inter alia, that it
is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media [and] to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation. 184
As others have observed, the Stratton Oakmont decision
appeared to have galvanized congressional support for the
Cox/Wyden Amendment because the Amendment sought to enlist
online service providers in the battle against indecency and to protect
them from liability when they did so. 15 Somewhat surprising in light
of the debate about section 230 today, the Cox/Wyden Amendment
provoked minimal discussion at the time it was incorporated in the
CDA. 
186
181. 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
182. 141 CONG. REc. 22,044 (1995).
183. See H.R, REP. No. 104-458, at 193-94 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (Statement of Rep. Cox) ("[O]ur amendment will ... protect [online
service providers] from taking on liability such as occurred in the Prodigy case in New York.").
184. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
185. As Professor Zittrain recounts, after the Stratton Oakmont decision "the U.S. Congress
was seized with a seemingly distinct cyberlaw issue: the ready availability of online pornography
to children-much greater than that of its physical-world counterpart. Limits on the availability of
offline indecent materials to children had already been effected primarily through gatekeeper
liability." Zittrain, supra note 167, at 261.
186. Schruers, supra note 13, at 213; see also Cannon, supra note 178, at 61-63 (explaining
the relationship between Stratton Oakmont and section 230).
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The Senate and House passed the CDA as Title V of the broader
Telecommunications Act of 1996, and President Clinton signed it
into law one week later on February 8, 1996. ' Before the CDA
even went into effect, however, a federal court struck down the
majority of the CDA as unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court
affirmed this decision in Reno v. ACLU. 188 But section 230 survived.
Indeed, many would say that "it flourished." 189
2. Judicial Application of Section 230
Section 230 belies its significance with rather modest-sounding
provisions. '90 Yet it upended a set of principles enshrined in common
law doctrines that had been developed over decades, if not centuries,
in cases involving offline intermediaries. While the passage of
section 230 in 1996, during the Internet's infancy, provided much
needed clarity for intermediaries, it halted judicial attempts to adapt
the common law to the changing technology. 9' This break from
common law doctrine has led some judges to express reluctance
when applying section 230's protections, '92 and presumably these
misgivings have influenced their interpretations of section 230,
which is a proposition examined in more detail in Part IV.
Although section 230 is far from a model of statutory
draftsmanship, a review of the cases interpreting this provision
reveals that courts largely have coalesced around a three-pronged
approach to determine whether a party is entitled to protection under
section 230. 113 Based on this approach, a defendant is entitled to
187. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133.
188. 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
189. Lemley, supra note 13, at 103.
190. Section 230 states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider," and "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (e)(3) (2006).
191. See Zittrain, supra note 167, at 262 (noting that section 230 "ended the percolation of
common law cases regarding the proper level of gatekeeping liability").
192. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003) (opining that "the broad
immunity created by § 230 can sometimes lead to troubling results"); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347
F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998).
193. While many judges have characterized section 230 as providing immunity from claims
relating to content provided by third parties, see, e.g., Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d
1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006), the subsection they cite, § 230(c), does not include the term
"immunity." The only mention of immunity-like protection occurs in subsection (c)(2), which
states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account
of ... any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to ... obscene, lewd, . . . or
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have a claim against it dismissed if each of the following three
conditions are satisfied:
1. The defendant is "a provider or user of an
interactive computer service."
2. The defendant is being "treated as the publisher or
speaker" of information for purposes of liability.
3. The challenged information is "information
provided by another information content
provider." "'
A potential fourth prong, stemming from the Ninth Circuit's
recent decision in Barnes v. Yahoo!, 195 asks whether the defendant
made a specific promise to remove content and failed to do so. This
new requirement is discussed in Part IV.
III. SUMMARY STATISTICS
The next two parts of the Article move from doctrine to
empirical results. Part III.A begins by outlining the methodology
employed in the collection and analysis of judicial decisions
involving section 230 that form the basis for the study. Part III.B
then presents a statistical summary of the decisions that form the
corpus of the data. Part IV, which follows, applies a number of
statistical tools, including correlation and regression analyses, to
examine in more detail how judges actually applied section 230.
otherwise objectionable" materials. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). Although § 230(c)(1) does not
grant immunity per se, in practical terms courts have applied it to that effect.
194. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Section 230 also prohibits liability directed at intermediaries that
facilitate access restrictions to objectionable material. See id. § 230(c)(2)(A). While a number of
decisions in the study set involve the application of section 230(c)(2), the list of these cases is
surprisingly short. See Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v.
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003); Green v. AOL, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003);
e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Quinstreet, Inc. v.
Ferguson, No. C08-5525RJB, 2008 WL 5102378 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2008); Nat'l Numismatic
Cert., LLC v. eBay, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-42-Orl-19GJK, 2008 WL 2704404 (M.D. Fla. July 8,
2008); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474
F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Doe v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8645 (N.D. I11. June 21, 2000); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Tr., 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va.
1998); Pallorium, Inc. v. Jared, No. G036124, 2007 WL 80955 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2007);
Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV 788630, 2000 WL
34016435 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000). However, this Article's primary focus is on § 230(c)(1)
because this provision is invoked most often in cases dealing with third-party speech.
195. 570 F.3d 1096, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2009) (refusing to dismiss claims pursuant to section
230 because plaintiff established a prima facie case of promissory estoppel). It is too soon to tell
whether the reasoning in Barnes will influence other courts.
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A. Study Methodology 1
96
This study attempts to bring the methodological rigor of social
science research to our understanding of the section 230 case law by
collecting all judicial decisions involving the application of section
230 and applying "content analysis," a methodology that seeks to
"generat[e] objective, falsifiable, and reproducible knowledge about
what courts do and how and why they do it." '9 The population of
interest is all decisions from February 8, 1996, the effective date of
section 230, through September 30, 2009, in which a party or the
court interposed section 230 as a defense to liability for online
content or acts. In drawing conclusions from these decisions,
however, readers should be aware that the analysis in this Article is
constrained by the recognition that the factual descriptions contained
in the opinions are likely to be incomplete. 198 Accordingly, readers
should not assume that the facts discussed in this study necessarily
correspond to the entirety of the facts on the ground in each case. 199
To collect the relevant decisions, I ran searches for decisions
citing section 230 on Westlaw and LEXIS, 00 the two primary legal
research services, and in the online Legal Threats Database
maintained by the Citizen Media Law Project at the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society at Harvard University (the "CMLP
196. A more detailed description of the methodology is included in the Appendix.
197. Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CAL. L. REv. 63, 64 (2008); see also Beebe, supra note 16, at 554 n.13; Reed C. Lawlor, Fact
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 110 (1968).
198. See Hall & Wright, supra note 197, at 95. Incompleteness stems from the fact that judges
typically limit their discussion only to those facts that are necessary to explain the case and to
justify their outcome. See id. at 96; Lawlor, supra note 197, at 109-10. Bias may also come into
play because judges sometimes distort the facts they report to justify the legal results they reach.
See Hall & Wright, supra, at 197. As Mark Hall and Ronald Wright explain, "[w]hile this is a
highly contentious charge, distortion does not have to amount to an outright misrepresentation of
facts. Instead, distortion results simply when judges emphasize opposing facts less than
supporting facts." Id. Indeed, this limitation exists in traditional doctrinal analysis no less than in
empirical content analysis. In the end, while judge-reported facts may not "purport to be the real
facts," they are "near enough so that the savings in labor justifies the approximation." Alan L.
Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and Limitations, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 32
(1981).
199. Nevertheless, the facts and reasons judges select and espouse make up the substantive
content of the law and determine the normative legitimacy of their decisions. See Hall & Wright,
supra note 197, at 96-97; Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1544 (2009).
200. Descriptions of the databases searched and search terms used is available in the
Appendix.
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Database"). 2' To have been counted as a judicial decision, the
decision must have announced a disposition of the case or motion
under consideration (e.g., denied, granted, dismissed, affirmed) and
must have stated at least one reason for the decision. If a decision
met these criteria, it was included in the universe of cases to be
coded, regardless of the form of the decision. 202
A research assistant reviewed the results to identify any
decisions reported uniquely in either LEXIS or Westlaw. This review
yielded a total of 249 decisions within the target date range from the
two databases. In order to find unreported decisions, I also ran a
search for lawsuit entries in the CMLP Database. This yielded 12
additional decisions that had not been reported on LEXIS or
Westlaw. I then reviewed all of the decisions to exclude those that
mentioned section 230 only in passing or otherwise had tangential
relevance to its use as a defense to liability for online content or acts.
I excluded 77 decisions on this basis. 203 This left 184 judicial
decisions in the sample set. 204
These decisions were then coded in order to capture general data
about each decision (e.g., date, caption, venue, posture); data about
the Web site or publication medium involved; data related to section
230 and specific data about the decision (e.g., the disposition of the
defense, appeal status); data about specific areas of judicial focus in
201. The Citizen Media Law Project, which the author directs, maintains a publicly accessible
database of lawsuits, cease and desist letters, subpoenas, and other legal threats directed at those
who engage in online speech. See Citizen Media Law Project, Legal Threats Database,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). The database contains decisions
from, among other sources, Westlaw, LEXIS, Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), legal blogs, and
reader tips.
202. This definition mirrors the approach taken in the U.S. Court of Appeals Database, an
interdisciplinary research effort to study judicial decision making. See DONALD R. SONGER, THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DATABASE: DOCUMENTATION FOR PHASE 1, at 8.
203. A plurality of the decisions (n = 33) were removed from the sample set because the
reference to section 230 was merely definitional (e.g., used to provide a definition for an
interactive computer service in another context or to define the Internet generally).
204. It is important to note that this study relies on a sample of the relevant decisions.
Although I sought to study the entire population of judicial decisions in which a party or the court
interposed section 230 as a defense to liability for content online, I cannot be sure that I collected
every decision. It is likely that some decisions, especially in state courts, escaped my notice. Like
other studies attempting to empirically examine case law, the exclusion of some unpublished
decisions may bias the results to the extent that there is a systematic difference between available
and unavailable decisions. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure
Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1884-87
(2005). Table A-I summarizes the search results and is available in the Appendix and on the
author's Web site at http://www.citmedialaw.org/section-230-empirical-study.
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the decision (e.g., whether the court analyzed the scope of the parties
covered by section 230, the nature of the defendant's relationship to
the source of the content); and various miscellaneous data about the
case (e.g., whether the plaintiff sued the third-party source of the
content, whether the information was submitted anonymously,
whether the court awarded sanctions or fees). 205 To check the
reliability of the coding process, I selected a random sample of 18
decisions from the 184 decisions in the study set. A second coder
independently coded this sample of 18 cases, and the results of the
two coded listings were compared in order to assess the degree of
inter-coder reliability. 206
B. Distribution of Decisions
In the more than thirteen years from the February 8, 1996
effective date of section 230 through the conclusion of this study on
September 30, 2009, state and federal courts in the United States
produced a total of 184 decisions from 140 cases in which a party or
the court interposed section 230 as a defense to liability for online
content or acts. 27 This is an average of 13.5 decisions per year
during the thirteen-year period, with an average of 8.1 decisions each
year (59.8%) holding that section 230 preempted at least one claim in
the cases studied.
1. Distribution by Year and Jurisdiction
Since section 230 went into effect in early 1996, the number of
decisions issued each year has generally increased, with a
particularly sharp increase after 2003. Table 1 sets out the yearly
distribution of the federal and state court decisions studied.
205. The coding instrument is available on the author's Web site at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/section-230-empirical-study.
206. The percentage rate of agreement and "Krippendorf's alpha" for each of the data fields is
listed on the coding form, which is available on the author's Web site at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/section-230-empirical-study. See KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 221-30 (2d ed. 2004).
207. Because a case was capable of producing more than one decision, the number of
decisions exceeded the number of cases.
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In all but one year-2000-the number of decisions issued by
federal courts equaled or exceeded the number of decisions in state
courts. Overall, the study set included more than twice as many
decisions from federal courts as compared to those from state courts.
208. "Preemption Found" includes decisions in which the court found preemption as to at least one
claim. It does not include decisions in which the court found no preemption or did not reach the issue.
The latter category accounts for situations where the court dismissed the claims on other grounds, such
as statute of limitations.
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This imbalance is somewhat surprising, given that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and that most of the claims involving
section 230 are state law torts. 209 As the next section in this Article
notes, some of this imbalance may be due to the fact that
approximately 18.5% of the federal court cases studied were
removed from state courts. 2 0 However, this does not account for all
of the disparity which is likely attributable to the fact that fewer state
court decisions were reported and available on Westlaw and
LEXIS. 21'
Figure A graphs these totals by year and provides a two-year
moving average of the number of decisions issued by federal and
state courts. As figure A reveals, the moving average of federal court
decisions shows a slight dip from 1999 to 2000 and a flattening from
2001 to 2002, followed by a steady and marked increase after 2003.
This upward trend largely holds true for state court decisions as well,
although there is more volatility in the yearly totals. The sharp
decline in decisions issued in 2002-less than half as many were
issued in both federal and state courts in 2002 as were issued in
2001-appears to mirror similar declines in other databases that
track legal decisions and filings over this time period. 212
209. On the other hand, the fact that speech on the Internet crosses state lines makes it likely
that federal courts had diversity jurisdiction over the defendants in many of the cases. For a
detailed breakdown of each claim, see infra Part III.B.3.
210. See infra Part III.B.2.
211. For a discussion of how sampling bias may influence the results, see Krawiec & Zeiler,
supra note 204.
212. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 567 (tracking cases raising copyright fair use); David Ardia,
Bloggers and Other Online Publishers Face Increasing Legal Threats, POYNTER ONLINE, Sept.
22, 2008, http://www.poynter.org/column.asp?id= 10 1&aid=150968 (tracking civil lawsuits filed
against online publishers).
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Thirty-five states are represented in the study set, including a
few unexpected states, such as South Dakota and Wyoming, given
their relatively small population sizes. The four most populous states,
California, Texas, New York, and Florida, had the largest
proportions of the decisions at 23%, 5%, 10%, and 7%,
respectively. 214 Listing these states in order of their population sizes
reveals, however, that the number of decisions in each state is out of
sync with the states' relative population sizes. For example, Texas is
the second most populous state, but it does not rank second in
decisions issued. Figure B shows how each state's proportion of the
decisions deviates from what would be expected based on the state's
relative population as determined in the 2000 U.S. Census. 215
213. Totals for 2009 reflect decisions issued through September 30, 2009.
214. See infra Table A-2 in the Appendix for a distribution of decisions by state.
215. Because the number of decisions in many states is relatively small, the deviations shown
in figure B are not amenable to statistical analysis for significance.
U A -1 d n : __e e
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Relative to its population size, the proportion of decisions in
California was nearly double the number that would be expected
based on the state's relative population alone. 216 New York and
Florida also had higher than expected totals, albeit less dramatic than
the difference in California. 217 For Texas, the deviation ran in the
opposite direction, as it had 1.98% fewer cases than expected based
on its relative population size. 21' These deviations may be due to a
number of factors, including the extent to which Internet and
technology companies are located in each state, whether the state is
considered to be a favorable or unfavorable jurisdiction for plaintiffs,
the reduced likelihood of publication of state court decisions, and
whether there was a disproportionate number of appeals from trial
court decisions in the state. 219
216. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, California had 12.04% of the U.S. population in
2000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SUMMARY FILE 1 (2000), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DownloadDatasetServlet?_lang=en. However, 23.37% of the
decisions in this study set arose in California.
217. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, New York and Florida had 6.74% and 5.98% of
the U.S. population in 2000, respectively, but 9.78% and 6.52% of the section 230 decisions. Id.
218. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Texas had 7.41% of the U.S. population in 2000.
Id.
219. An analysis of the first three factors is outside the scope of the present study, but the
fourth factor-the appeal rate in each state-is not. The mean appeal rate for trial court decisions
(both state and federal) for all states was 33.7%. The appeal rate for trial court decisions in
California (41.9%) was nearly 10 points above the mean.
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2. Distribution by Venue
As previously noted, the study set included more than twice as
many decisions from federal courts as compared to those from state
courts. Table 2 breaks down these federal court decisions by circuit
and district. Just as with the composite state data, California courts
held disproportionate sway in the totals, with the circuit and district
courts of the Ninth Circuit dominating the decisions. Indeed, table 2
reports that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was
responsible for 37.5% of the circuit court decisions, while district
courts in the Ninth Circuit issued 27.3% of all district court
decisions. Other than the Third Circuit, which issued 12.5% of the
circuit court opinions, no other circuit broke into double digits.
Among the various district courts, the Northern District of California
and Southern District of New York were each responsible for 7.1%
of the district court opinions.
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Not surprisingly, the number of federal district court decisions
exceeded the number of circuit court decisions by a wide margin of
4.13 to 1. This disparity did not hold true for the state court data; the
number of state appellate court decisions was nearly identical to the
number of state trial court decisions. Unlike in the federal courts,
where the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to hear a case involving
section 230, a total of four decisions arose from the highest courts in
California, Florida, Massachusetts, and New York. 22 Figure C
illustrates the relationship between the three court levels studied.
FIGURE C
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AND










220. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d
1010 (Fla. 2001); Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746 (Mass. 2007); Lunney v.
Prodigy Servs. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999).
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Figure C also reveals a significant disparity in the number of
trial court decisions issued from federal courts as compared to state
courts, ninety-nine to thirty, respectively. Given the parity in the
number of decisions at the appellate level and relative similarity in
appeal rates between the two jurisdictions,221 the disparity would
appear to be due to either a high rate of removal from state courts to
federal courts or a lower publication rate of state trial court opinions.
Given that only 18.5% of the federal district court decisions arose in
cases that were removed from state court, the disparity between the
number of federal and state court decisions at the trial court level is
likely attributable in part to the fact that fewer state trial court
decisions were reported and available on Westlaw and LEXIS.222
3. Distribution by Legal Claim
Fifty-seven different legal claims arose in the 184 decisions
studied, ranging from aiding and abetting the distribution of obscene
material to unfair and deceptive trade practices. Because plaintiffs
typically asserted more than one claim, the overall number of legal
claims exceeded the number of cases and decisions studied. In total,
courts considered 254 claims (an average of 3.2 claims per case)
while addressing the application of section 230. 223 Figure D provides
a breakdown of the incidence of each claim in both state courts and
federal courts and includes several oddball claims that demonstrate
the creativity some plaintiffs exhibited in these cases.
221. In fact, the appeal rate in state courts was higher than in federal courts--44.2% of state
trial court decisions were appealed and 28.5% of federal district court decisions were appealed.
222. While there is considerable research on publication rates in federal appellate courts, see
Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71, 120-21 (2001), the author could not
find any studies estimating the publication rates in state trial courts. For a discussion of what
impact the exclusion of unpublished state court decisions may have on these results, see Krawiec
& Zeiler, supra note 204.
223. This total includes only claims "considered" by a court in the context of section 230. If a
party or the court did not interpose section 230 as a defense to a claim, it was not included in the
claims considered category. For example, several cases involved allegations of copyright
infringement-a claim expressly excluded from section 230's coverage-and if neither the court
nor the defendant raised section 230 as a defense, copyright infringement would not be marked as
a claim considered in that case. See Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found., Inc., No. CV-08-0054-
PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 2705377 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2008); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d
492 (E.D. Pa. 2006). If, however, a party did interpose section 230 as a defense to copyright
infringement, that claim was marked as "considered." See UMG Recording, Inc. v. Veoh
Networks, Inc., No. 600558/08, 2008 WL 5027243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2008) (defendant
asserted section 230 as defense to copyright infringement but court dismissed on forum non
conveniens grounds).
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FIGURE D
FREQUENCY OF LEGAL CLAIMS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Aiding and Abetting I
Anti-Cybersquatting Consunr Protection 0
Anti-Scalping c 0 Federal Court
Anti-Sparn Act
Autographed Spoils Menorabilia Statute El [ State Court
Breach of Continct W I
Basiness Disparagenrt mt2
Oild Sexa Abuse u
Civil Rights Act (federal) N
Civil Rights Act (state)
Conputer Frud and Abuse Act
Conspiracy
onsunr Protection Act (state)
Conversion U
Copyright Infringenet (coama lw) 1V
Cyberstaog
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Defamation
Discinmnation I
Distribution of Cald Pornography E=
Distribution ofObscene Material MR=









Injury to Business Reputation U













Spoliation of Evidence U
Substantive Due Process









Wilful And Wanton Conduct I
Winter 2010] COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT § 230 429
Predictably, defamation claims topped the list, making up 17.2%
of all claims considered by courts in the context of a section 230
defense. The next most frequent claim was negligence, followed by
tortious interference. These findings roughly track other studies
examining "cybertort" causes of action, which found that defamation
and business torts predominated. 224 Given that states vary in how
they title similar causes of action, table 3 summarizes the six most
frequently occurring legal claim types. 125 Grouped with its sibling
claims, defamation, libel, slander, and disparagement arose in more
than half (50.5%) of the decisions under study. Deceptive trade
practices, unfair competition, and false advertising also appeared in a
significant proportion (20.7%) of the decisions. A large number of
these claims arose in cases involving content on search engines and
marketplace/auction sites, locations where consumers search for
products and post reviews. When these claims, which are not
defamation claims but rather are claims asserting that the defendant
engaged in some form of unfair business practice, are combined with
tortious interference claims, the category of business torts made up
the second highest proportion of the claims, arising in 37% of the
decisions.
224. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 92 (2003) (reporting that business torts made up 35% of
claims studied and defamation made up 27%).
225. Given that Congress's express intent in passing the CDA was to remove obscene
material from the Internet, it is notable that there were only five cases involving the alleged
distribution of obscene materials or child pornography and these claims were not among the most
frequently occurring claim types. See People v. Gourlay, No. 278214, 2009 WL 529216 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2009); Voicenet Commc'ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04-cv-1318, 2006 WL 2506318 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 30, 2006); Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. 05-cv-1526, 2006 WL 273599 (W.D. La.
Feb. 1, 2006); Doe v. America Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385 (Fla. App. 1998). In several other
cases, however, plaintiffs brought negligence claims premised on the intermediary's failure to
prevent harmful contact with minors or the distribution of obscene material. See, e.g., Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008); Doe IX v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663
(E.D. Tex. May 22, 2009); Doe v. Bates, No. 05-cv-91, 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27,
2006); Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (Ct. App. 2009); Kathleen R. v. City of
Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 (Ct. App. 2001).
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TABLE 3
MOST COMMON LEGAL CLAIM TYPES
Decisions
Claims Number Percentage of
Total
Defamation (libel, slander) and 93 50.5%
disparagement
Negligence 54 29.4%
Deceptive trade practices, unfair competition, 38 20.7%
false advertising
Privacy torts (intrusion, false light,
publication of private facts, 35 19.0%
misappropriation/right of publicity)
Tortious interference with contract or 30 16.3%
business relations
Intentional infliction of emotional distress 24 13.0%
4. Distribution by Medium of Publication
and Content Type
This section of the Article examines where on the Internet all of
this allegedly tortious and illegal content is being published and in
what form. The largest proportion (21.3%) of the decisions involved
speech that occurred on discussion forums, such as Yahoo! Finance,
Craigslist, and Usenet. 226 Other common publication media included
online matching services, such as apartment matching and dating
sites, as well as e-mail, search engines, retail Web sites, and
consumer review sites. None of these other publication media,
however, appeared in the decisions more than 10% of the time. Table
226. A list of the publication medium categories is included infra in table 4 and a description
of each category is included in the Appendix.
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4 reports the frequency and relative percentages among the various
publication media. 227
TABLE 4
PUBLICATION MEDIUM AND PROPORTION
OF ANONYMOUS CONTENT
Frequency Anonymous Content
Publication Medium Number Percentage of Number Percentage ofTotal Total
Blog 11 5.2% 3 27.3%
Chat Room 9 4.3% 3 33.3%
Consumer Reviews 15 7.1% 11 73.3%
Content Hosting 4 1.9% 2 50.0%
E-mail 18 8.5% 5 27.8%
Forum 45 21.3% 31 68.9%
Gripe Site 4 1.9% 1 25.0%
Internet Services or 11 4.7% 1 10.0%
Access
Marketplace 15 7.1% 5 33.3%
Dating and 15 7.1% 10 66.7%
Matchmaking Services
News 7 3.3% 0 0%
Organization 9 4.3% 3 33.3%
Other 1 0.5% 0 0%
Portal/Directory 2 0.9% 1 50.0%
Retail Site 18 8.5% 5 27.8%
Search Engine 16 7.6% 5 31.3%
Social Network 7 3.3% 1 14.3%
Web site - General 4 1.9% 0 0%
Information
Wiki - General 1 0.5% 0 0%
Information
Total 211 41.2%
227. Because a case could involve more than one publication medium, the total listed in table
4 exceeds the number of decisions studied.
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The conventional wisdom seems to be that the Internet is awash
in anonymous content. 228 While this may be true in some online
contexts, in more than half of the section 230 decisions (58.8%), the
speech at issue was not published anonymously. Because the degree
of anonymity a user can maintain varies depending on the nature of
the communication, the systems used, and other circumstances, for
the purposes of this analysis a decision was tagged as involving
anonymous speech if the court noted that the speech was anonymous
or the parties stated that the source was unknown. 229 In several online
contexts, such as news sites, anonymous speech was not at issue in
any of the decisions.
This is not to say, however, that anonymous speech is
insignificant or unimportant. In several common media of
communication, discussion forums, consumer reviews, and online
matching/dating services, more than two-thirds of the speech at issue
was anonymous. Moreover, as discussed in Part V, anonymity can
pose a significant hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to hold a culpable
third party liable for injuries he or she has caused.
5. Distribution by Intermediary Role
Intermediaries play many different roles online, and this
diversity is reflected in the section 230 case law. In Part I,
intermediaries were grouped into three broad classifications based on
the functional role they play in facilitating the publication of content
online: communication conduits, content hosts, and
search/application providers. 230 To these three categories a fourth
228. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64 (2009); KrisAnn
Norby-Jahner, "Minor" Online Sexual Harassment and the CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions
for Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 207, 245 (2009); Richard Bernstein,
The Growing Cowardice of Online Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/world/americas/27iht-letter. 1.15670185.html.
229. Anonymity involves two related concepts: anonymity and pseudonymity. The use of
identity abstractions, such as Social Security numbers, school IDs, and even nicknames, is
pervasive in society. These identifiers are typically referred to as pseudonyms. Unlike
pseudonymity, anonymity generally refers to a situation where the individual or entity discloses
no identifying characteristics. JOHN HENRY CLIPPINGER, A CROWD OF ONE: THE FUTURE OF
INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 148-49 (2007). Simply because someone uses a pseudonym, does not
mean they are anonymous. Traceable details always exist; it is just a matter of how hard one
looks. This is especially true on the Internet, where every computer that connects to the network
must have a unique IP address and where servers and routers within the network routinely log
communications. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part I.
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must be added: the actual users of Web sites and other interactive
computer services.
Table 5 reports the intermediary role that most closely matches
the functions performed by the party claiming protection under
section 230.231 As table 5 shows, the most common role of
defendants claiming a section 230 defense was that of content host,
with 68% of the total. The number of conduit providers and the
number of search/application providers were relatively similar, but
well below the total for content hosts. The user category, denoting a
defendant who claims immunity under section 230 as a user of an
interactive computer service, 232 was the least common role
represented in the 184 decisions studied. This is not surprising given
that few users are in a position to assert section 230 as a defense to
liability because they are typically the source of the information at
issue.
TABLE 5
INTERMEDIARY TYPE AND SOURCE STATUS
Decisions Party Foundto Be Source
Percentage Percentage
Intermediary Type Number ofrTtal Number of Total
of Total o oa
Conduit 21 10.7% 0 0%
Content Host 134 68.0% 13 9.7%
Search or Application 28 14.2% 3 10.7%
Provider
User 14 7.1% 3 21.4%
Total 197 19 9.6%
231. Because more than one defendant may be involved in a case or decision, the number of
defendant types exceeds the total number of decisions studied. For example, if the plaintiff sued
YouTube for hosting a defamatory video and her ISP for facilitating its transmission, and both
defendants asserted a section 230 defense, the decision would be tagged with two defendant role
labels: content host and conduit. If the plaintiff sued two content hosts, the decision would be
tagged with one role label: content host.
232. See infra Part IV.A.1.
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Table 5 also reports how often courts found that the party
asserting a section 230 defense was the original source of at least
some of the content at issue in the case. This determination needs to
be distinguished from the situation in which a court found that the
defendant was responsible for the content at issue. This is a subtle
but important distinction. In making the determination whether the
defendant is responsible for the content, courts look both to the
defendant's relationship with the third-party source and the
defendant's interaction with the content itself. 233 Both of these
inquiries presume that a third party-the original source of the
content-exists. "'
But what about the situation where the defendant created the
content on its own? A defendant who is the original source of the
content is not entitled to protection under section 230 regardless of
whether the defendant is a provider or user of an interactive
computer service. 235 The rightmost columns in table 5 are meant to
capture this relatively rare situation and reveal how often defendants
who claimed protection under section 230 were found to be the
original source of the content at issue in the case. As table 5 reports,
defendants across all role types were found to be the source of some
of the content at issue 9.6% of the time. Not surprisingly, users were
more likely to claim protection under section 230 in situations where
they were the source of the content, while conduits and content hosts
fell at the other end of the spectrum.
C. Win Rates
This section of the Article and the next examine the proportion
of unreversed decisions that found claim preemption under section
230, as well as the appeal, affirmance, and reversal rates in the
section 230 case law. The term "unreversed decisions" is used
throughout this Article to indicate preemption findings that were not
subsequently reversed on appeal. While it is useful to know the
proportion of claims that were held preempted, only a decision that
remains good law can truly be considered a "win" for the party
asserting section 230 as a defense.
233. See infra Part IV.A.4.
234. See infra Part IV.A.4.
235. See infra Part IV.A.5.
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Overall, courts found preemption under section 230 for at least
one claim in 59.8% of the decisions. When reversed decisions are
excluded from the calculations, the overall preemption rate rises to
60.3%. 236 As table I 237 shows, the preemption rate year-to-year
showed no discernable trend. It varied from a high of 100% in 1997
to a low of 25% in 1999. There was little difference between the
unreversed preemption rates in state courts and those in federal
courts. Federal courts preempted at least one claim in 59.7% of the
decisions. In state courts, the proportion was 61.8%.
More interesting results can be found by examining the
unreversed preemption rates in federal district and circuit courts
broken down by federal circuit, as shown in table 6. Federal courts in
the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit had the lowest preemption
rates, finding preemption in only 30% and 33.3% of their decisions,
respectively, which is more than 26% below the overall preemption
rate for federal court decisions. Courts in two other circuits, the
Tenth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, also had preemption rates
substantially below the overall rate of 59.7% for federal courts.
236. These percentages only address preemption under section 230 and do not indicate that in
39.7% of the decisions the court ultimately found for the plaintiff on the merits of her claims.
237. See supra Part II.B. 1.
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Preemption rates in the federal courts varied considerably based
on the case posture as well. 238 Overall, 69.7% of unreversed federal
court decisions addressing the application of section 230 in a motion
for summary judgment found preemption, while 55.6% of the
decisions involving a motion to dismiss or motion to strike did so.
Courts in the Ninth Circuit, which generally had higher preemption
percentages, found preemption in 62.5% of the cases involving a
motion to dismiss. That proportion jumped to 92.3% for summary
judgment motions. 239 Courts in several other circuits, including the
Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, also showed increases in their
preemption rates for cases involving summary judgment as compared
to motions to dismiss.
As previously noted, the most frequently occurring claims in the
section 230 cases were defamation-type claims. As figure E shows,
there was a marked disparity in the preemption rates for these claims
among federal and state courts. In federal courts, only 44.4% of
deceptive trade practices and unfair competition claims were
preempted. In state courts, the preemption rate was nearly twenty
points higher, coming in at 63.6%. An even larger disparity exists
among intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, for which
federal courts had an 81.8% preemption rate and state courts were
almost thirty-two points lower, at 50%. For the remaining claim
categories, the state court preemption rate was within ten points of
the preemption rate in federal court.
238. The posture categories indicate the posture of the case at the time when the court
addressed the application of section 230. In other words, if the section 230 issue arose in a motion
to dismiss, the decision was tagged with "motion to dismiss." If the losing party filed a motion for
reconsideration or appealed the first decision to another court, the subsequent decisions were also
tagged with "motion to dismiss." Only five of the eleven possible posture categories are listed in
table 6. Posture categories with the fewest unreversed decisions are not included. Accordingly,
the distribution totals for each row may not equal 100%. For a listing of all posture categories, see
infra table A-3 in the Appendix.
239. As discussed infra Part V.B. 1, a number of judges have expressed reluctance in applying
section 230 at the motion to dismiss stage, finding that as an affirmative defense it is more
appropriately raised after the completion of discovery. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655,
657 (7th Cir. 2003) (instructing that section 230(c)(1) does not constitute grounds for dismissal
for failure to state a claim, and should be analyzed as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's claims);
Novak v. Overture Services, 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) ("As an initial matter, the
Court notes that invocation of section 230(c) immunity constitutes an affirmative defense. As the
parties are not required to plead around affirmative defenses, such an affirmative defense is
generally not fodder for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.").
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To put these claim groupings into context, table A-4 in the
Appendix lists the unreversed preemption rates for all legal claims
that were considered by a court in the context of section 230.
Predictably, claims that are expressly excluded from section 230's
coverage,1 4  such as copyright claims, trademark claims, and
Electronic Communications Privacy Act claims,241 showed a
preemption rate of 0%. 242 At the other end of the spectrum, a number
of claims, including products liability, disclosure of trade secrets,
negligence, and nuisance claims, saw preemption rates approaching
or equaling 100%.
When courts did not dismiss a claim under section 230, they
declined to do so for a number of reasons. In more than half of the
decisions (59.4%) in which a court did not dismiss a claim under
section 230, the court did not reach the question of section 230's
application because it found that the claims at issue warranted
dismissal on other grounds. 243 As to the remaining decisions in
which a court found section 230's protections inapplicable as to least
one claim, the court found that in 56.4% of those decisions, the
defendant was either the actual source of, or otherwise responsible
for, the content at issue; in an additional 35.9% of the decisions the
court held that the claims themselves fell outside section 230's
protection. In 7.7% of the decisions in which a court did not dismiss
at least one claim, the court found that the defendant did not qualify
as a provider or user of an interactive computer service. These
findings are described and analyzed more fully in Part IV below.
D. Appeal, Affirmance, and Reversal Rates
Of the 184 decisions studied, 62 were appealed to a higher court,
for an overall appeal rate of 33.7%. 244 For federal district court
decisions, the appeal rate was 28%, a rate that is substantially higher
than the appeal rates calculated by other researchers for federal
240. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
242. For a discussion of how courts have defined and applied these exemptions, see infra
notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
243. If these claims are removed from the calculations, the unreversed preemption rate rises to
76.9%.
244. In 19 of the 184 decisions, the time to appeal had not yet expired when this study was
completed. These decisions were excluded from the appeal rate calculations.
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district courts in other subject areas. 245 Trial court decisions in state
courts evidenced an even higher appeal rate: 33.3%. Figure F charts
the appeal rates for decisions from trial and appellate courts,
revealing that at all court levels, the appeal rate for state courts
exceeded the rate for federal courts.
FIGURE F









245. Beebe, supra note 16, at 575 (calculating a 25.1% appeal rate from federal district courts
in copyright fair use cases for the period 1978-2005); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and
Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate
Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 664 & tbl.1 (2004) (calculating a 10.9% appeal rate
for all district court cases and a 21% appeal rate for district court cases with a judgment for one
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However, appeal rates tell only part of the story. While the
majority of decisions were not appealed to a higher court, those that
were appealed evidenced a relatively low overall reversal rate of
16.4%. The reversal rate for federal court decisions was 11.4%, well
below the reversal rates found in other empirical studies. 246 The
reversal rate was somewhat higher in state courts: 23.1%. Table 7
reports in detail the affirmance and reversal rates for decisions that
were appealed in federal and state court. References to affirmed or
reversed "on other grounds" indicate the court's specific treatment of
the section 230 issue raised on appeal. As table 7 shows, most
appeals resulted in either an affirmance or denial of certiorari, with a
substantially higher affirmance rate for decisions dismissing claims
under section 230 (45.5%) as compared to decisions that did not
dismiss a claim under section 230 (17.7%). Of the decisions that
were reversed or vacated, the majority were reversed or vacated on
the basis of the lower court's application of section 230, not on other
grounds.
246. See Beebe, supra note 16, at 574 (calculating a 33.8% reversal rate for federal circuit
courts in cases involving copyright fair use for the period 1978-2005); Kevin M. Scott,
Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges,
40 LAW & SoC'y REv. 163, 177 tbl.l (2006) (calculating a 32% reversal rate for all federal
circuits during the period 1980-2002).
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Lastly, relatively few of the appellate decisions involved a
concurrence or dissent. Of the fifty-five decisions arising in appellate
courts or higher, only eight (14.5%) included a concurrence or
dissent with regard to the majority's holding concerning section
230.247 Unsurprisingly, three of the eight decisions came from the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which generated several
concurrences and dissents associated with the circuit's panel and en
banc decisions in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com. 248 Of the remaining forty-seven appellate decisions
without a concurrence or dissent, eight (17%) were issued as per
curiam decisions.
IV. CONTENT ANALYSIS
This part of the Article seeks to identify what factors led judges
to grant or deny dismissal under section 23.0 and how strongly those
factors influenced each other and the outcome in the case. It begins
by describing six areas of judicial inquiry and reporting their
frequency within the section 230 case law. Part IV.B then applies
correlation and regression analyses to examine how these areas of
inquiry relate to each other and to a court's ultimate finding on the
question of preemption.
A. Areas of Judicial Inquiry
While section 230 does not lay out a stepwise approach for
judges to follow when applying its provisions, courts largely have
coalesced around a three-pronged test to determine whether a party is
entitled to dismissal, which asks (1) whether the party claiming
section 230 protection is "a provider or user of an interactive
247. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1204-06 (10th Cir. 2009) (concurrence by
Judge Tymkovich); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concurrence by Judge Fisher); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1176-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (concurrence in part and dissent in part by Judge
McKeown); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921,
930-35 (9th Cir. 2007) (concurrence in part and dissent in part by Judge Reinhardt and
concurrence in part by Judge Ikuta); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1036-41 (9th Cir. 2003)
(concurrence in part and dissent in part by Judge Gould); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510,
529-31 (Cal. 2006) (concurrence by Justice Moreno); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010,
1018-28 (Fla. 2001) (dissent by Justice Lewis); Maughan v. Google Tech., Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d
861, 870-79 (Ct. App. 2006) (concurrence in part and dissent in part by Judge Vogel, and
concurrence by Judge Rosenthal).
248. 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007), rev 'd, affd, & vacated in part en bane, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th
Cir. 2008).
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computer service"; (2) whether the party claiming protection is being
"treated as the publisher or speaker" of information for purposes of
liability; and (3) whether the information at issue is "information
provided by another information content provider."249 Although
these prongs provide a handy roadmap for judges, they merely
provide a starting point for analyzing the section 230 cases. Indeed,
to simply say that the court answered yes as to the first and second
prongs, but answered no as to the third prong, masks the subtle
distinctions in how judges actually decided these cases.
This section of the Article seeks to qualitatively examine the
arguments and justifications judges articulated when deciding
whether an Internet intermediary should or should not be held liable
for facilitating the speech of others. 250 It does so by identifying six
areas of judicial inquiry within the cases and categorizing the
decisions according to how the court treated each inquiry. 251 The first
three areas of inquiry hew closely to the prongs identified above. The
latter three areas, which examine the nature of the intermediary's
relationship with the source, its interaction with the content, and its
relationship with the plaintiff or public, add more nuance.
1. Interactive Computer Services Covered
Courts typically start their analysis by addressing whether the
defendant is entitled to invoke section 230 in the first place. Unlike
other statutory safe harbors,252 section 230 does not differentiate
between categories of intermediaries. Instead, it applies to any
"provider or user of an interactive computer service," 253 a phrase
249. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
250. An empirical study such as this has its roots in American Legal Realism, which seeks to
understand law by focusing on what judges actually do. See, e.g., Herman Oliphant, A Return to
Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 71-76, 107 (1928) (exhorting law professors to employ social
science tools in the study of what courts do). Indeed, as Oliver Wendell Holmes famously
proclaimed: "[P]rophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457,461 (1897).
251. Because some decisions were placed in more than one category, the total number of
category tags may not equal the total number of decisions. In addition, in roughly a quarter of the
decisions (23.8%), the court did not reach the question of section 230's application, typically
because it dismissed the case on other grounds. Those decisions are not included in these category
summaries.
252. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2006) (defining four classes of intermediaries under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
253. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
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courts have construed broadly. 254 In fact, in many of the decisions
studied, either the plaintiff conceded that the defendant was a
provider of an interactive computer service (ICS),255 the court
assumed this to be the case based on the plaintiffs own description
of the defendant, 256 or the court simply did not address the issue at
all.
TABLE 8
INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICES (ICS) COVERED
Finding Number of Percentage ofDecisions Total
Defendant found not to be provider 3 2.0%
or user of an ICS
Defendant found to be an ICS 48 32.7%
without differentiation
Defendant found to be provider of an 35 23.8%
ICS
Defendant found to be user of an ICS 10 6.8%
Court decision did not address the 51 34.7%
ICS issue
Total 147
254. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the term
"includes a wide range of cyberspace services, not only internet service providers").
255. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir.
2000) (plaintiff conceded issue); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex.
2007) (conceded); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(conceded); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(conceded); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001)
(conceded).
256. See, e.g., Mayhew v. Dunn, No. 580-11-07, 2008 WL 4281984 (Vt. Super. Ct. Mar. 18,
2008) (assumed); Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. 05-cv-1526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38471, at
*6 (W.D. La. Dec. 27, 2005) (court assumed based on plaintiffs description); Schneider v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (assumed).
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To aid the analysis that follows, each decision was categorized
according to how the court treated the question of whether the party
asserting section 230 qualified as a provider or user of an ICS. The
five tags used in the coding are listed along with their relative
frequencies in table 8. Decisions falling in the first category,
indicating that the judge found that the defendant was not a provider
or user of an ICS, invariably went on to state that the defendant was
not entitled to protection under section 230. 257 The remaining
categories represent findings in the defendants' favor.
As table 8 reports, more than one-third (34.7%) of the decisions
lacked any discussion regarding whether the defendant was a
provider or user of an ICS. When judges did address this question,
however, they overwhelmingly found that the defendant qualified
under this prong. As a result, nearly all defendants that provide
access to online content have been held to be providers or users of an
ICS. 25  Examples include online auction Web sites,259 libraries that
provide Internet access to the public, 260 online dating sites, 261 online
classifieds, search engines, "' providers of Internet access through
computer rentals, 264 retail Web sites, 26 5 and employers that provide
Internet access to their employees. 266
257. See regression analysis infra section B. The three decisions that stated that a defendant
did not qualify as a provider or user of an ICS were 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 2d 273, 295 (D.N.J. 2006); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 3:02-CV-
2727-G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *30-31 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004); and Novartis
Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1284,
1301 (Ct. App. 2006). Cf Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA,
129 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1258 n.9 (Ct. App. 2005) (declining to reach section 230 issue, but
expressing doubt that defendant qualifies as a provider or user of an ICS).
258. Courts have been quick to reject the argument that section 230 applies only to ISPs and
intermediaries that provide Internet access. See, e.g., Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 922
(I11. App. Ct. 2003). But see 800-JR Cigar, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (holding that defendant's
search engine was not an ICS because "as far as th[e] Court can tell, GoTo does not provide
access to the Internet like service providers such as AOL").
259. See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 714 (Ct. App. 2002).
260. See Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 776-77 (Ct. App. 2001).
261. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Doe
v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (D.N.H. 2008).
262. See, e.g., Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 681, 698 (N.D. 11. 2006).
263. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
264. See, e.g., Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001).
265. See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
266. See, e.g., Delfmo v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376 (Ct. App. 2006).
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In addition, while it is often overlooked, Congress did not limit
section 230's protections only to providers of interactive computer
services. Users also are covered, 267 although the term "user" is not
defined in the statute and the limited legislative record does not
indicate why Congress included users under section 230's
umbrella. 268 In the few cases that have addressed the definition of
"user," the courts have concluded that individual Internet users,
including those who "actively select[] and post[] material based on
its content" are entitled to the same protections providers receive
under section 230.269
2. Legal Claims Covered
In order for a claim to be preempted under section 230(c)(1), the
cause of action must treat the defendant as a "publisher or speaker of
information provided by another information content provider." 
270
When applying this standard, courts typically evaluate the substance
of the plaintiffs claims to determine whether liability is predicated
upon the defendant's status as a publisher of the content at issue.
267. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
268. See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
269. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 526, 528 (Cal. 2006); see also Grace v. eBay, Inc.,
16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 192, 198 (Ct. App. 2004) ("We conclude based on the plain meaning of the
statutory language that the term 'user' as used in the statute encompasses all persons who gain
access to the Internet through an ISP or other service or system . .
270. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT§ 230
TABLE 9
SCOPE OF CLAIMS COVERED
Finding Number of Percentage 
of
Decisions Total
Claim qualifies for preemption 69 46.6%
defense under section 230
Claim does not qualify for
preemption defense because claim 1 0.7%
is based on distributor liability
Claim does not qualify for
preemption defense because claim 5 3.4%
is not based on publisher liability
Claim does not qualify for
preemption defense because claim 3 2.0%
is a federal IP claim
Claim does not qualify for
preemption defense because claim 5 3.4%
is a state IP claim
Claim does not qualify for
preemption defense because 2 1.4%
claimant seeks equitable relief
Court decision did not address
scope of claims covered by 63 42.6%
section 230
Total 148
Table 9 lists the seven tags used to code how each decision
addressed this issue. Decisions falling in the first and last categories
involved findings-or assumed findings-in the defendants' favor.
Decisions in the remaining categories indicate that the court found
that at least one claim at issue in the case fell outside section 230's
protection. 271
271. See, e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding claim based on state IP law); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.
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As table 9 reports, judges exhibited a surprising tendency to
ignore this inquiry. In nearly half (42.6%) of the decisions, the judge
did not specifically address whether the claims at issue qualified for
preemption under section 230, apparently assuming without
discussion that the plaintiff sought to hold the intermediary liable as
a publisher or speaker. A small number of decisions (10.9%) found a
claim not covered for the reasons described in table 9, while almost
half of the decisions (46.6%) expressly found the claims at issue
were encompassed by section 230.
Defamation-type claims were far and away the most numerous
claims in the section 230 case law, 272 and the courts consistently held
that these claims fell within section 230's protections. 273 But section
230 is not limited solely to defamation claims. A wide range of
claims fall within its ambit. For example, courts held that section 230
applied to claims such as invasion of privacy, 274 misappropriation, 275
tortious interference, 276 civil liability for criminal law violations, 277
general negligence, 27  and negligent failure to remove information
after notification. 279
Supp. 2d 409, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding no preemption because claim based on federal IP
law).
272. See supra Part III.B.3.
273. See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 04-cv-462, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1424, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko's Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d
1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).
274. See, e.g., Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 Fed. Appx. 833, 833 (3d Cir. 2007); Doe v. Bates,
No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006);
Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. 05-1526, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38471, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec.
27, 2005). But see Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008)
(refusing to dismiss invasion of privacy claim insofar as it was based on a right of publicity
theory, which the court considered a state IP claim under section 230(e)(2)).
275. See, e.g., Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. 06-1164 ADM/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11727, at *28-29 (D. Minn. Feb. 15, 2008); Chelsea Fine Custom Kitchens, Inc. v. Apartment
Therapy LLC, No. 0603554/2007, 2008 WL 2693129, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008).
276. See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1117-18 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
277. See, e.g., Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 27, 2006).
278. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing
claim asserting that MySpace was negligent for failing to implement age verification procedures
and to protect a fourteen-year old from sexual predators), aft'd, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir.
2008).
279. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009); Green v. Am.
Online, 318 F.3d 465, 465 (3d Cir. 2003); Global Royalties v. Xcentric Ventures, 544 F. Supp. 2d
929, 931-32 (D. Ariz. 2008); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., No. CIV. CL 97-631 AE, 1997 WL
374223, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 26, 1997).
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This last claim is especially significant. Recall that under the
common law, distributors face liability if they know or have reason
to know of the tortious or illegal materials they are distributing.280
Plaintiffs have long argued that the distinct meanings attributed to
these terms under the common law, and Congress's explicit inclusion
of the term "publisher" without mention of distributor liability in
section 230(c)(1), demonstrate that section 230 limits only publisher
liability, while leaving distributor liability intact. Although courts
generally have rejected this argument, 28' as discussed in Part IV.A.6,
the dispute is not entirely moribund.
While Congress did not expressly list the claims it intended to
preclude, it did list the areas of law to which section 230 immunity
does not extend: federal criminal law, communications privacy law,
and intellectual property (IP) law. 282 The first two categories are
relatively straightforward. The last category has been the subject of
some disagreement, as courts have grappled with whether state law
IP claims-or state claims that could be classified as IP claims, such
as the right of publicity-are outside section 230's protections. Mark
Lemley has noted: "We can be quite confident that [the section 230
IP exception] applies to patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
somewhat less confident that trade secrets and the right of publicity
are also IP claims, and even less confident for the penumbra of
quasi-P claims."283
An examination of the decisions reveals that only the Ninth
Circuit has held that state IP claims qualify for preemption under
section 230. The court reasoned that "permitting the reach of any
particular state's definition of intellectual property to dictate the
contours of this federal immunity would be contrary to Congress's
expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the
variods state-law regimes."2 4 District courts in other circuits have
280. See supra Part II.A.3.
281. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.10 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660
(7th Cir. 2003) (musing in dicta that section 230 does not extend to distributor liability).
282. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2006).
283. Lemley, supra note 13, at 108 (footnote omitted).
284. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding plaintiff's
right of publicity/misappropriation claim preempted under section 230).
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roundly rejected this interpretation of section 230,285 although no
other circuit court of appeals has squarely addressed the issue yet.
A second disagreement evident in the decisions stems from the
fact that IP claims are not self-defining. For example,
misappropriation and right of publicity claims, which arose eighteen
times in the decisions studied, exhibit characteristics of both tort law
and intellectual property law, generally subjecting to liability anyone
"who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another." 286 Although the Eleventh Circuit has suggested in dicta that
section 230 does not cover such claims,287 only one court to date has
held that section 230 does not foreclose right of publicity claims. 288
3. Information Content Providers Covered
In order to be covered by section 230, the information at issue
must be "provided by another information content provider."
' 289
While seemingly straightforward, this short phrase has been the
genesis of most of the disagreements within the section 230 case law.
Section 230 defines an information content provider (ICP) in
section 230(f)(3) as "any person or entity that is responsible, in
whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer
service.""' Under section 230, a defendant can be both an ICP and a
285. See, e.g., Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 703-04
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 302 (D.N.H. 2008);
Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall &
Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d409,415 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). Misappropriation arose from
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's 1890 article on privacy torts, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REv. 193 (1890). In their highly influential article, Warren and Brandeis expressed concern
over the increasingly sensationalist press that was "overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and ... decency[,]" and cautioned that various technological developments-
particularly "instantaneous photograph[y]"--posed a grave threat to privacy. Id. at 195-96. While
misappropriation and its sister claim, the right of publicity, vary widely from state to state, both
have their roots in Warren and Brandeis's article. See Russell J. Frackman & Tammy C.
Bloomfield, The Right of Publicity: Going to the Dogs?, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 1996,
available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/rftb.html (providing an overview of the history,
policy, and evolution of the right of privacy among the circuits).
287. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1323-24 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (noting in
dicta that "there appears to be no dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual
property right," but dismissing plaintiff's right of publicity claim on the merits without reaching
the question of whether section 230 applied).
288. Friendfinder, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
289. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006).
290. Id. § 230(0(3).
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provider or user of an interactive computer service. When a
defendant is both an ICP and a provider or user of an interactive
computer service, protection under section 230 would extend only to
information provided by another person or entity that qualifies as an
ICP. 291 Accordingly, a defendant will lose out on section 230's
protections if either the third-party source of the information fails to
qualify as an ICP or the defendant is found to be the source of the
content at issue in the case.
TABLE 10
INFORMATION CONTENT PROVIDERS (ICP) COVERED
Finding
Number of Percentage of
Decisions Total
Defendant found not to be the ICP with 24.3%
regard to the content at issue
Source found to be the ICP with regard to 39 25.7%
the content at issue
Source found not to qualify as an ICP 1 0.7%
Defendant found to be the ICP with 15 9.9%
regard to the content at issue
Court decision did not address the ICP 60 39.5%
issue
Total 152
Table 10 lists the five tags used to code for this issue, along with
their relative frequencies. Decisions falling in the first two categories
(which make up 50% of the decisions) represent findings in the
defendant's favor. In other words, the court found that an actual third
party existed and qualified as an ICP. In the decisions in the next two
categories (10.6% of the decisions), the court concluded that the
defendant was not entitled to protection under section 230 because
291. See id. § 230(c)(1), (d), (f(3).
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either the source did not qualify as an ICP 292 or the defendant was the
source of the content at issue. 293
As with the previous areas of inquiry, judges often (in 39.5 % of
the decisions) ignored this inquiry, apparently assuming without
discussion that the information was provided by another ICP. Two
courts, however, have questioned whether section 230's requirement
that the content at issue be provided "through the Internet" means
that the original source must be the one that provided the content
through the Internet or that the information need only end up on the
Internet eventually.
In Batzel v. Smith,294 the Ninth Circuit concluded that this
question turned on whether a reasonable person would believe that
the original source intended that the content be published on the
Internet, noting that "[t]he structure and purpose of § 230(c)(1)
indicate that the immunity applies only with regard to third-party
information provided for use on the Internet.' ' 295 Policy concerns
clearly motivated the court to cabin in section 230's protections:
"immunizing a publisher or distributor for including content not
intended for Internet publication increases the likelihood that
obscene and defamatory material will be widely available." 
296
As table 10 reports, only one decision concluded that a third-
party source was not an information content provider. That decision,
292. Only one decision fell in this category. See Brandewyne v. Author Solutions, Inc., No.
2004-CV-4363-TT, 2006 WL 4005011 (D. Kan. Jan. 31, 2006), which is discussed infra note 298
and accompanying text.
293. See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); Mazur v. Ebay, Inc.,
No. C 07-03967 MHP, 2008 WL 618988 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008); MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595 (N.D. Tex. April 19, 2004).
294. 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
295. Id. at 1033.
296. Id. at 1034. The Ninth Circuit also focused on whether the defendant received the
information in his capacity "as a provider or user of interactive computer services," suggesting
that if he received the information in a "snail mail" letter it would be unlikely that the letter was
sent to him in his "capacity as [provider of] a Web site service." Id. at 1033. The court offered the
example of a hard-copy magazine article or book that an online publisher decides to publish to the
Internet. "One would not say," the court reasoned, "that the author of [such content] 'provided' it
to an interactive computer service provider or user by allowing the article to be published in hard
copy off-line. Although such an article is available to anyone with access to a library or a
newsstand, it is not 'provided' for use on the Internet." Id. at 1032-33. This distinction is not of
idle concern given Google's efforts to digitize the world's libraries and make the books-written
by authors who never anticipated their publication online-available through its Google Book
Search. See Google Book Search News, The New York Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/business/companies/google-inc/googlebooksearch/index.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2009).
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from a state court in Kansas, applied the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in
Batzel and held that a print-on-demand book publisher was not
entitled to protection under section 230 because the information was
provided for publication in a hard-copy book, not "on the
Internet." 297
4. Nature of the Intermediary's
Relationship with the Content's Source
The analysis now moves to more challenging ground as it seeks
to identify the subfactors that may have influenced a court to
conclude that the defendant was responsible for the creation or
development of the content at issue in the case. In making this
determination, courts have focused on both the defendant's
relationship with the third-party source and the defendant's
interaction with the content itself. This first inquiry, which attempts
to determine whether the source is truly independent from the
defendant, is the subject of this subsection.
Section 230 provides little guidance for courts grappling with
this issue, other than to state that the information must be "provided
by another information content provider." 298 It might seem logical to
assume that courts would look to state agency law to assist in this
assessment, but only one court has explicitly done this. 299 Because of
the proliferation of peer-produced, jointly authored content online,
the question of who qualifies as another information content
provider is likely to take on increasing significance. 300 While no
297. Brandewyne, 2006 WL 4005011, at *6-7. Contra Almeida v. Amazon, Inc., 456 F.3d
1316, 1326 (11 th Cir. 2006) (dismissing claims against Amazon.com based on Internet sales of
book); Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12479, at *41-43
(S.D. W. Va. Feb. 19, 2008) (same).
298. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
299. See Raggi v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, No. 08-cv-943, 2009 WL 653000 (D. Nev.
Mar 10, 2009) (finding no principal-agent relationship existed between police department and
police officers who allegedly posted defamatory content on union Web site); Myers, supra note
13, at 190-92 (examining whether a court might hold Wikipedia responsible for the acts of its
moderators, administrators, and sysops); Note, Badging: Section 230 Immunity in a Web 2.0
World, 123 HARv. L. REv. 981, 997-1000 (2010) (discussing application of agency principles to
interactive Web sites); cf Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 199 Fed.
Appx. 738, 743-44 (11 th Cir. 2006) (implying that Xcentric Ventures would be responsible for
the actions of its agents in editing third-party reports to include defamatory content).
300. See Eric Goldman, Co-Blogging Law, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2006) ("One
can expect plaintiffs will allege that co-bloggers are partners or employers to avoid the otherwise
terminal effect of § 230 on their lawsuits."). Wikipedia is the best known example of this type of
457
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court has addressed this particularly thorny issue in the context of
interactive online services, we can glean some guidance by looking
at the handful of decisions that mention facts germane to assessing
an intermediary's relationship with the source.
First, courts have held that payment alone does not make a
defendant responsible for the third party's actions. 31 Second,
independent contractors have been deemed to be sufficiently
independent from the defendant so as not to obviate section 230's
protections. 302 Third, the fact that the source of the information was
the defendant's employee did not lead a court to conclude that the
defendant was responsible for the source, presumably because
sending threatening e-mail messages and posting on online forums
was not part of the employee's official duties. 303
interactive online service, see Myers, supra note 13, at 190, but other examples exist, including
the free/open-source software development community, see BENKLER, supra note 25, at 63-68.
301. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that Drudge was
"paid $3,000 a month-$36,000 a year, Drudge's sole, consistent source of income"). But see
FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding defendant responsible for
acts of third party because defendant made payments to third-party purchaser of confidential
phone records).
302. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51-52.
303. See Delfino v. Agilent Tech., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th at 790, 806-08 (Ct. App. 2006).
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TABLE 11
INTERMEDIARY'S RELATIONSHIP TO SOURCE
Number of Percentage of
Finding Decisions Total
Not addressed in decision 113 76.4%
No relationship between 6 4.1%
defendant and source
Provided computer access 6 4.1%
Encouragement 8 5.4%
Support services 4 2.7%
Independent contractor 2 1.4%
Payment for content 3 2.0%
Editorial control 2 1.4%
Master-agent 1 0.7%
Employer-employee 2 1.4%
Joint venture 1 0.7%
Total 148
Table 11 lists the eleven tags used to code for this issue along
with their relative frequencies. Decisions falling in the first four
categories (which make up 90% of the decisions) represent the
defendant's minimal control over the source. Decisions in the next
three categories (6.1% of the decisions) imply the defendant had
some control over the source, and the decisions in the final four
categories (4.2% of the decisions) indicate the defendant's high
degree of control over the source. Even as to these latter categories,
however, courts generally have not held that the defendant was
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responsible for the content simply because it had the ability to
exercise control over the third-party source. "
5. Nature of the Intermediary's
Interaction with the Content
This inquiry focuses on the role the defendant played in the
creation of the content and seeks to assess whether the defendant was
"responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of
the information at issue in the case. 305 When assessing a defendant's
level of responsibility, courts have tended to focus on several factors,
including the degree to which the defendant exercised editorial
control over the content, encouraged the submission of tortious or
illegal content, or facilitated the creation or publication of the
content.
304. See, e.g., Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51-52; Delfino, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 795;
Schneider v. Amazon.corn, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 42-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
305. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (2006).
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TABLE 12
INTERMEDIARY'S INTERACTION WITH CONTENT
Finding Number of Percentage of
Decisions Total



























Table 12 lists the categories that capture how courts addressed
this issue. The categories are listed roughly in increasing order of
interaction, from no interaction to self-creation. Decisions in the first
three categories (which make up 50.9% of the decisions) indicate
that the defendant had no discernable interaction with the content at
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issue. Decisions in the middle categories (32.2% of the decisions)
indicate moderate interaction with the content. Decisions falling in
the bottom three categories (14.6% of the decisions) denote
substantial interaction with the content at issue. Of course, if a court
finds that the defendant created the information itself, the defendant
is not entitled to protection under section 230. 306
A review of the decisions reveals that courts have consistently
held that the mere exercise of traditional editorial functions, such as
deciding what content to publish or remove, does not make an
intermediary responsible for the content it publishes. 37 These
traditional editorial functions include screening objectionable content
prior to publication, as well as correcting, editing, or removing
content. "' Even intermediaries that took an active role in editing
content have been found to be entitled to invoke section 230.309
Encouraging or soliciting others to submit content also generally
has not been found to deprive a defendant of section 230's
protections. 3 One recurring defendant that operates a Web site
called the "Bad Business Bureau" has provoked several decisions on
this point. 3" Although the defendant, Xcentric Ventures, allegedly
306. See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 199 Fed. Appx. 738,
744 (1lth Cir. 2006); Anthony v. Yahoo!, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Hy
Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148-49 (D. Ariz. 2005);
MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595, at
*9 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
307. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he exclusion of
publisher' liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of
publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining
its basic form and message.").
308. See, e.g., id. at 1031; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. 2000); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997); GW Equity
LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-0, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1445, at *18;
Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51; Landry-Bell v. Various, Inc., No. 05-CV-1526, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38471, at *6-7 (W.D. La. Dec. 27, 2005); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41.
309. See, e.g., Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 725-26 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(holding that forum operator who regularly deleted offensive user postings, gave guidelines for
posting, and edited and re-posted messages to remove obscenities was protected under section
230).
310. See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003);
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090,1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
311. See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932-33 (D.
Ariz. 2008); Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:04-CV-47-FtM-
34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *40 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008); GWEquity LLC, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1445, at *12-15; Hy Cite Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1149; MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 02-cv-2727, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *33-36 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 19, 2004).
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encouraged vituperous postings that it then promoted on its site and
in its marketing materials, courts in Arizona, Florida, and Texas held
that these activities, without more, did not make Xcentric responsible
for the allegedly defamatory content submitted by third parties. 312
Intermediaries, by dint of their position as middlemen,
invariably play some role in facilitating the publication or
distribution of content. Nevertheless, courts have not found that an
intermediary was responsible for third-party content simply because
it provided a platform for others to create content, even when that
facilitation involved providing submission forms and drop-down
selections. 3' This is so even if the intermediary knows that third
parties are using its platform to create tortious or illegal content. "'
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc
recently held that Roommates.com, an apartment matching service,
was not shielded from claims under the Fair Housing Act315 (FHA)
and related state laws because it "created or developed" the forms
and answer choices that those seeking to use the service had to fill
312. See Global Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933 ("It is obvious that a Web site entitled
Ripoff Report encourages the publication of defamatory content. However, there is no authority
for the proposition that this makes the Web site operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the
'creation or development' of every post on the site."); Whitney Info. Network, Inc., 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *42. But see MCW, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *33-34 (finding
defendant was itself an ICP because it "directed" consumers to "take photos of(1) the owner, (2)
the owner's car with license plate, (3) the owner handing out Rip-off Reports in front of [the
plaintiffs] offices, and (4) the [plaintiffs] sign in the background with the Rip-off Reports in
hand").
313. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 ("Doubtless, the questionnaire facilitated the
expression of information by individual users. However, the selection of the content was left
exclusively to the user.... Matchmaker cannot be considered an 'information content provider'
under the statute because no profile has any content until a user actively creates it."); Whitney
Info. Network, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11632, at *36 (holding "that the mere fact that
Xcentric provides categories from which a poster must make a selection in order to submit a
report on the ROR Web site is not sufficient to treat Defendants as information content providers
of the reports," even if some of those categories were defamatory); Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F.
Supp. 2d 719, 725-26 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (noting "the mere fact SexSearch provided the
questionnaire Jane Doe answered falsely is not enough to consider SexSearch the developer of the
false profile"); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (rejecting
contention that defendant became an ICP "because the anonymous third party was prompted to
select subcategories through the Defendant's database gathering system," thereby "direct[ing] the
third party's selections").
314. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1169 n.24 (9th Cir. 2008); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198-99 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
315. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006).
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out.316 The court reasoned that by requiring members to answer
questions about their gender and sexual-orientation preferences,
Roommates.com was essentially causing the third parties to make
discriminatory statements, and as such, it was liable as a co-creator
of the content. " The court also held that Roommates.com was
responsible for its users' violations of the FHA because it permitted
users to search the profiles of other members by selecting the same
discriminatory preferences. "'
While the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Roommates.com
has been cited in a dozen decisions so far, only two decisions in the
study set relied on its definition of "development" to hold that a
defendant was not entitled to section 230's protections. 3" The
remaining decisions confined the reasoning in Roommates.com to
that case's rather unique set of facts: a provider of an interactive
computer service that required the submission of unlawful
content. 320
6. Nature of the Intermediary's
Relationship with the Plaintiff or Public
This section of the Article addresses whether an intermediary's
relationship with the plaintiff or the public has any bearing on the
application of section 230, and touches on one of the oldest and most
persistent arguments for liability in the section 230 case law, as well
as the newest theory of liability which came out of the Ninth
Circuit's recent decision in Barnes v. Yahoo!I, Inc. 321
316. Roommates.corn, 521 F.3d at 1157-58. For example, all prospective users had to choose
from a drop-down menu to indicate whether they were willing to live with "'[s]traight or gay'
males," only "'[s]traight' males, only "'[g]ay' males," or "[n]o males" and had to make
comparable selections pertaining to females. Id. at 1165.
317. Id. at 1166.
318. Id. at 1167.
319. FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that provider
was responsible for developing the content because it paid its researchers to acquire telephone
records it knew to be protected by confidentiality laws and therefore "it contributed mightily to
the unlawful conduct of its researchers"); NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., 2009 WL 995483, at *12
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (refusing to dismiss anti-scalping claims against ticket broker
because broker "materially contributed" to violations).
320. See, e.g., Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009).; Doe
IX v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009); Atlantic Recording Corp. v.
Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 09-
CV-1385, 2009 WL 3416106, at *6 (N.D.I1. Oct. 20, 2009).
321. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
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From the earliest section 230 cases onward, plaintiffs have
argued that once they put a defendant on notice that it is distributing
tortious or illegal material, the defendant is under an obligation to
remove the content; if it fails to do so within a reasonable time, it is
not entitled to protection under section 230. The first reported
decision by an appellate court to address-and ultimately reject-
this argument, Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,322 turned out to be
tremendously influential, as the Fourth Circuit's lengthy analysis of
the issue has served as a guide for other courts facing this theory of
liability. 323 In rejecting the plaintiff's assertion that America Online,
Inc. (AOL) became liable as a "distributor" once it had notice that it
was hosting defamatory information on its bulletin board, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the distinction between publisher liability and
distributor liability was meaningless for purposes of section 230.
[O]nce a computer service provider receives notice of a
potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a
traditional publisher. The computer service provider must
decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting. In
this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on AOL for
assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes
liability-the publisher role. 324
Although a few decisions after Zeran cast doubt on whether
distributor liability was subsumed by section 230's prohibition of
publisher liability, 325 the case law is now consistent in holding that
an intermediary's refusal to remove content after notification is
protected by section 230, and even if the intermediary has actual
knowledge of falsity, it will not be liable for the speech of third
parties. 326 In fact, courts have held that an intermediary can continue
322. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
323. Id. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Zeran has been cited by courts 137 times as of
September 30, 2009.
324. Id. at 332-33.
325. See, e.g., Grace v. Ebay, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 4th 984, 996 (Ct. App. 2004); Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 430 (Ct. App. 2003), rev'd, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006); Doe v. Am.
Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1020-21 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J. dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009); Barrett, 146 P.3d
at 521.
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to host tortious content after the original author has asked to have it
removed. 327
Until very recently, there was nothing in the case law to suggest
that a plaintiff could impose on an intermediary an obligation to
remove content or prevent its publication. That changed when the
Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Barnes v. Yahoo/, Inc., 328 the
latest in a long line of cases involving fake profiles on online dating
services. In Barnes, the court held that section 230 did not preempt a
claim for promissory estoppel that was based on a specific promise
made by a Yahoo! employee that she would "personally walk the
[plaintiffs complaint] over to the division responsible for stopping
unauthorized profiles and they would take care of it." 329 The Ninth
Circuit was careful, however, to cabin its holding, stating that section
230 did require dismissal of the plaintiffs negligent undertaking
claim, which was predicated upon Yahoo!'s failure to remove the
profile after she notified the company that it was fake. 3' The court
let the promissory estoppel claim go forward only because a Yahoo!
employee made a specific promise to the plaintiff. 331
The Barnes court also cautioned that promises made in a Web
site's terms of service-for example, a promise to remove all
defamatory content--or in marketing materials do not create an
obligation to remove content; "a general monitoring policy, or even
an attempt to help a particular person, on the part of an interactive
computer service such as Yahoo! does not suffice for contract
liability." 332 Even as to her promissory estoppel claim, the court
327. See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. XCentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931-32 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (rejecting argument that a Web site operator, by declining to remove material at
author's request, had itself become the creator or developer of the content); Sturm v. eBay, Inc.,
No. 1-06-CV-057926 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 27, 2006) (holding that eBay was not required to
remove user feedback, even after parties entered into settlement stipulating that feedback was
defamatory and both had written eBay asking that it be removed).
328. 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
329. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099, 1109. The fake profile at issue had been created by plaintiff's
ex-boyfriend and contained nude photos of the plaintiff, her personal and work contact
information, and statements that she was interested in sex. Id. at 1098.
330. Id. at 1103 (noting that "removing content is something publishers do, and to impose
liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher
of the content it failed to remove").
331. Id. at 1107 (clarifying that "Barnes does not seek to hold Yahoo! liable as a publisher or
speaker of third-party content, but rather as the counter-party to a contract, as a promisor who has
breached").
332. Id. at 1108.
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noted that the plaintiff had merely made out a prima facie claim and
sent the case back to the district court to determine whether she could
in fact produce sufficient evidence to proceed on the claim. "' It is
too soon to tell whether the reasoning in Barnes will influence other
courts, but the court's clear statement that general promises do not
create enforceable obligations seems to undercut a potential theory of
liability that, according to Eric Goldman, had been "festering" as a
result of ambiguous language in earlier cases. 114
TABLE 13
INTERMEDIARY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF OR PUBLIC
Finding Number of Percentage of
Decisions Total
Not addressed in decision 97 65.1%
Received notice of problematic content 37 24.8%
Promise to plaintiff to take action 4 2.7%
Promise to public in marketing materials 1 0.7%
Promise to public in ICS terms of service 10 6.7%
Total 149
Table 13 reports how often courts addressed whether the
defendant made a specific promise to the plaintiff or a general
promise to remove content through its marketing materials or terms
of service. Not surprisingly, most decisions (65.1%) did not discuss
the nature of the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff or the
public. In the few decisions that addressed this issue, a plurality
(24.8%) simply mentioned that those defendants had received notice
of the tortious or illegal content they were distributing. Relatively
333. Id. at 1109.
334. Eric Goldman, Ninth Circuit Mucks Up 47 USC 230 Jurisprudence . . . Again!?-
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Tech. & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2009/05/ninthcircuit-m.htm (May 13, 2009, 08:04 PM PST).
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few decisions focused on whether the defendants had made promises
through their marketing materials or terms of service to moderate or
remove harmful content, and only one decision found such a promise
to be determinative on the question of section 230's applicability. 3
B. Correlation and Regression Analyses
This section of the Article examines whether the areas of inquiry
described above have any relationship to how courts actually decided
section 230 cases. It would seem fairly obvious that if the court
concludes that the defendant is not a provider or a user of an
interactive computer service, the defendant is not going to find
protection under section 230. Similarly, if the court concludes that
the third-party source of the content at issue does not qualify as
another information content provider or the claims under
consideration do not qualify for preemption, then section 230 will
not preclude liability.
Correlation analysis provides a quantitative way to test these
assumptions by examining the interrelationship among these
variables. In other words, it can reveal whether the different areas of
judicial inquiry described in section A were associated with a finding
of preemption and whether a finding as to one area is associated with
a finding as to another area. Table 14 presents a contingency table
that lists the correlation coefficients for each pairwise comparison of
areas of inquiry. A higher correlation coefficient indicates a stronger
association with an eventual determination that section 230
preempted the claim, and a stronger relationship between that area
and the corresponding area of inquiry in the table. 336 As expected, a
335. Mazur v. eBay Inc., No. C 07-03967 MHP, 2008 WL 618988, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4,
2008) (declining to dismiss fraud claim because "eBay's statement regarding safety affects and
creates an expectation regarding the procedures and manner in which the auction is conducted
and consequently goes beyond traditional editorial discretion"). But see Doe v. SexSearch.com,
502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 729-30 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that "[p]laintiff cannot claim he was
misled or he reasonably relied on the representation that 'all members are 18+' when the Terms
and Conditions clearly state the Web site did not guarantee (and took no responsibility for
verifying) members' ages"); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (finding that defendant's claim to "call every business to verify the information, so you can
be assured of the most current and accurate listings" did not create additional liability).
336. The sum of the absolute values for the pair of correlation coefficients reported for each
area of inquiry does not equal zero because the decisions may not have addressed all of the
inquiries in equal measure. Each of the six areas was assigned two binary variables (0 = no, I =
yes) that reflected whether a court's finding favored the defendant or the plaintiff. For example, if
the court stated that the defendant qualified as a provider or user of an interactive computer
service, the "Defendant is an ICS" finding would be coded with a 1 and the corresponding finding
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finding that a claim is covered by section 230 and that the
information at issue was provided by another information content
provider was statistically correlated (significant at both the a = 0.05
and a = 0.01 levels) with an eventual finding of preemption.
Similarly, a finding that the defendant failed to qualify as a provider
or user of an interactive computer service was significantly
correlated with a finding of no preemption under section 230.
The remaining three areas of inquiry also present some
interesting results, albeit more nuanced. A defendant's level of
interaction with the content showed a moderate, but statistically
significant, association with a finding of preemption, suggesting that
if the court found that the defendant had no interaction with the
content at issue, this finding would likely coincide with a conclusion
that section 230 preempted the claim. Alternatively, if the court
found that the defendant had substantial interaction with the
content-for example, through the use of pre-populated submission
forms-such a finding would likely coincide with the conclusion that
section 230 did not preempt the claim at issue. 31
for the plaintiff, "Defendant is not an ICS," would receive a 0. If the court instead found that the
defendant did not qualify as a provider or user of an ICS, this finding would be in favor of the
plaintiff, so the "Defendant is not an ICS" would be coded with a 1 and the corresponding finding
for the defendant, "Defendant is an ICS," would be coded with a 0. But if the court did not
address this inquiry, as was often the case, or issued a neutral finding, both variables would be
coded with a 0. The specific findings that inure to the benefit or detriment of the parties are
described in Part IV.A.
337. The fact that the strength of these associations was relatively modest is likely due, in
part, to the fact that courts frequently did not explicitly address all of the areas of inquiry in every
decision.
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Correlation analysis also suggests that a court's finding that the
defendant had substantial interaction with the content or substantial
control over the source was significantly associated with a finding
that the source of the content did not qualify as another information
content provider. This association makes intuitive sense because a
defendant's substantial interaction with the content or source could
turn the intermediary into the source of the content, leading a court to
conclude that the content at issue did not actually come from a third
party. As to findings addressing a defendant's relationship with the
source or with the plaintiff or the public, the associations between a
finding in those areas and the eventual finding that section 230 did or
did not preempt a claim are largely negligible. Again, this lack of a
statistical correlation reinforces what would be expected given that
courts only recently began to focus on these issues after the Ninth
Circuit's decisions in Roommates.com and Barnes.
While the correlation matrix in table 14 reveals a number of
statistically significant associations between a court's findings and an
eventual finding of preemption, the correlation coefficients cannot
tell us whether these findings in fact influenced the likelihood that
the court would find preemption. Regression analysis is the proper
tool to answer that question, as it can indicate whether the findings
predict a finding of preemption by controlling for other variables that
covary with the variable of interest and may provide insights into the
considerations that drove judges to decide the cases as they did.
Table A-5 in the Appendix sets out the results of a logistic regression
model predicting the likelihood of preemption as a function of the
areas of judicial inquiry described in Part V.A. 338 While the model
presents a number of interesting results, a few of the key findings are
discussed below.
338. A logistic regression model was necessary because the dependent variable, "Preemption
Granted," is dichotomous (0/1); therefore, linear regression models such as Ordinary Least
Squares are not appropriate to perform estimations. As a result, the coefficients listed in table A-5
in the Appendix lack an intuitively meaningful scale for interpreting their strength. Nevertheless,
they can reveal statistical significance and provide an indication of whether the independent
variable under study leads to an increased or decreased likelihood of a finding of preemption. See
Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial
Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1431-32 n.230
(1998).
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1. Expected Findings
The model reports that court findings that the defendant was not
a provider or user of an interactive computer service, or that the
defendant controlled the third-party source "predict failure
perfectly." The model also reports that if a court concludes that the
claim at issue did not fall within section 230's coverage, then the
likely result is a finding of no preemption. In other words, the model
predicts that if a defendant loses on any of these questions, then the
court will likely find no preemption. 33  These results are not
particularly surprising given that these are fundamental requirements
of a section 230 defense.
2. Unexpected Findings
The model also predicts that if a court states in its decision that a
claim is within section 230's coverage, then the result will always be
a finding of preemption. We know from reviewing the case law,
however, that courts do not find preemption as to every claim that
potentially falls within section 230's broad scope. Given that the
model predicts success perfectly with regard to this finding, we can
surmise that when a judge took the time to state that a specific claim
type qualified for preemption under section 230, the judge eventually
found preemption as to that claim. In fact, this prediction is backed
up by a review of the decisions. 340
Overall, correlation and regression analyses support the initial
assumption that courts generally have coalesced around the six areas
of judicial inquiry described in Part IV.A. However, the instant
analysis also suggests a body of case law that lacks rhetorical and
analytical consistency because judges often fail to address key
elements of a section 230 defense. While section 230 has been in
existence for more than thirteen years, many of the decisions exhibit
a haphazard approach to its application, often ignoring threshold
questions or assuming that certain requirements are met. While some
339. Overall, the logistic regression model described in table A-5 in the Appendix reports that
it correctly classified 86.8% of the decisions. The model automatically dropped any observations
(decisions) associated with a variable that predicted success or failure perfectly. As a result, the
model dropped seventy-five observations associated with those variables from the calculations.
340. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that claim
was covered by section 230 and then dismissing the claim); Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711,
711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (same); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 37
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (same).
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT§ 230
elements of a section 230 defense are relatively straightforward and
rarely disputed, courts would do well to at least articulate their
findings explicitly.
V. DISCUSSION
As with any empirical study, there are many ways to view and
interpret the data. A few of the more interesting findings are
discussed in this part of the Article.
A. Viability of Claims Under
Common Law Liability Theories
One of the best ways to assess a statute's impact on an area of
law is to systematically compare the case law pre- and post-
enactment. Unfortunately, this approach will not work for section
230, as courts issued only two reported decisions addressing an'
Internet intermediary's liability for speech-based harms prior to
section 230's enactment. "' As a rough proxy, however, this section
of the Article identifies several factors in the decisions that are
germane to the question of liability under the common law, and then
applies those factors in a "what if section 230 did not exist" thought
experiment in order to gain insight into how section 230 has changed
the liability landscape for intermediaries. Readers should be cautious
of drawing definitive conclusions from the following discussion,
however, because courts almost certainly would have focused on
different facts had they been addressing common law liability
theories rather than the application of section 230. 342 Nevertheless,
the effort is still useful in that it foregrounds how section 230 has
changed the liability landscape and whether, as discussed more fully
in subsequent subsections, section 230 is providing adequate
protection for intermediaries.
To aid in the instant analysis, each defendant in the study set
was placed into one of the four online intermediary groupings
described earlier--conduits, content hosts, search/application
341. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Servs., Co., Trial LAS Part 34, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
Another case filed against Prodigy in 1994, Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., did not come to a
decision until after section 230's effective date. 723 N.E.2d 539, 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
(declining to reach section 230 issue but observing that in transmitting e-mail, "an ISP, like a
telephone company, is merely a conduit[]").
342. See supra Part W.A.
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providers, and users-based on the role the defendant played in
facilitating the publication or distribution of the content at issue in
the case. Drawing from the areas of judicial inquiry listed previously
in tables 11 through 13, 3"' each decision was then evaluated to
ascertain whether the court noted in its decision that the defendant
had knowledge of the tortious or illegal content or exercised editorial
control over the content. '" The tabulations from this review are
reported in table 15.
343. See supra Part IV.A.
344. This was done solely by looking at the decisions themselves. Decisions falling in the last
six and last seven categories in tables 11 and 12, respectively, were counted as evidencing
editorial control. Decisions tagged with either "knowing publication" in table 12 or "received
notice of problematic content" in table 13, were counted as evidencing knowledge. In addition,
decisions in which the court found that the defendant itself was the source of the content were
excluded because those defendants were not actually serving as intermediaries.
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Table 15 also predicts whether the intermediaries in the section
230 cases would have been susceptible to liability under the common
law. In other words, if section 230 did not exist, would courts
applying common law liability principles hold these defendants
responsible for the third party's tortious speech? In order to answer
this question, each defendant was placed in an appropriate common
law liability category based on its intermediary type and degree of
editorial control and knowledge. It was assumed that conduit
intermediaries would qualify for the common law's lenient treatment
of common carriers unless they exercised editorial control, ' in
which case they were evaluated under the standard for distributors.
Content hosts, search/application providers, and users were all
evaluated under publisher liability standards if they exercised
editorial control, and under distributor liability standards if they did
not. 346
The results in table 15 must be read with some caution,
however, because the common law doctrines do not correspond
precisely to the roles intermediaries play online and even within the
four classifications, intermediaries varied in their level of interaction
with third-party content. It is no wonder that in the early days of the
Internet, commentators described the liability standards facing
operators of online services as confusing and muddled. 47
Furthermore, this analysis only addresses the viability of the claims
against the intermediary types under the common law and section
230. It does not assess whether the third-party content at issue in the
cases was ultimately actionable. Furthermore, even if section 230
does not preempt the claim at issue, a defendant may still be entitled
to dismissal of the claim on other grounds.
Even with the preceding caveats in mind, table 15 presents some
intriguing results. It suggests that conduit intermediaries would have
fared better under the common law than they did under section 230.
However, this may be somewhat misleading, given that all conduits
345. Although ISPs and other providers of Internet access generally have not been classified
as common carriers, see supra note 119, they share many of the characteristics of traditional
common carrier conduits. See, eg., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000);
Anderson v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 320 N.E.2d 647, 649 (N.Y. 1974); Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542.
346. Search/application providers were an especially difficult group to handicap due to their
ambiguous status under the law. See Grimmelmann, supra note 57, at 27-30.
347. See Cutrera, supra note 158, at 559; Anne Wells Branscomb, Common Law for the
Electronic Frontier, 265 SCI. AMER. 154 (1991).
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do not currently enjoy the additional protections and obligations the
law assigns to common carriers as was assumed for purposes of
doing the calculations behind table 15. Nevertheless, of the ten
decisions involving conduits in which the court did not find
preemption under section 230, the court did not even reach the
question of section 230's application in six of those decisions
because it found that these cases warranted dismissal on other
grounds. 
348
Not surprisingly, this analysis suggests that content hosts and
search/application providers fared better under section 230 than they
would have under the common law. For these intermediaries, the
editorial-control distinction in the common law breaks down because
virtually all content hosts and search/application providers have the
ability to exercise editorial control over third-party speech, even if
they do not choose to exercise that power. 141 Indeed, they would
likely fare far worse under the common law than predicted if courts
were to apply publisher liability to an intermediary that simply has
the ability to exercise editorial control. 350
What is surprising is that intermediaries in all four categories
fared as well as they did under the common law. 351 Some of this is
undoubtedly due to the fact that judges did not focus on the two key
determinates of liability under the common law-knowledge and
editorial control-when addressing the application of section 230.
Preemption under section 230 does not typically turn on those
factors, so the tabulations likely underreport the true number of
defendants that would face liability under the common law. But it is
likely also due to the fact that many of the intermediaries who
interposed section 230 as a defense did nothing more than provide a
348. See, e.g., Lunney, 723 N.E.2d at 542; Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir.
2003); Abate v. Maine Antique Digest, 2004 WL 293903, at *1 (Mass. Super. 2004); Morrison,
153 F. Supp. 2d 930, 930 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
349. This refers to the technical ability to control content through filtering. As to the practical
challenges of performing this function, many Internet intermediaries do not have the expertise or
financial ability to selectively filter or block content; as a result, their only option is wholesale
blocking of content. See supra Part I.B.
350. As discussed in Part I, supra, all content hosts have the ability-at least in theory-to
filter or block content.
351. In fact, the difference between the cases predicted not to have liability under the
common law and the cases preempted by section 230 was not statistically significant (X
2 = 6.73 P
= .081).
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platform for others to engage in speech. 352 Would the common law
have evolved some way to grant these intermediaries a presumption
of non-liability akin to the common law's approach to conduit
liability? ... We simply do not know.
What table 15 suggests, however, is that many of the
intermediaries that invoked section 230 likely would not have faced
eventual liability under the common law because they lacked
knowledge of and editorial control over the third-party content at
issue in the cases. Given this prediction, one might question whether
section 230 is necessary. But this points to one of section 230's most
important functions for intermediaries: it seeks to give them the legal
certainty, or in First Amendment terms, "breathing space," '  to
facilitate the distribution of third-party speech that may contain
injurious or illegal content. Without this increased certainty, risk-
averse intermediaries would be less willing to facilitate the speech of
others and the public would be burdened by their censorship. 3" The
next section of the Article examines whether section 230 has
succeeded in providing this breathing space.
B. Assessing Section 230's Impact on Defendants
Not unlike other entities that operate in uncertain legal
environments, an intermediary that facilitates the speech of others
has three primary concerns: (1) the likelihood it will be sued; (2) if it
is sued, the likelihood that it will succeed in the case; and (3) the cost
of defending the case and any liability damages. 356
352. Table 16 reports that more than half (54.5%) of the intermediaries had no editorial
control or knowledge of the content at issue in the case.
353. Cf Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 800 F. Supp. 928, 931-32 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that CBS broadcast affiliate's power and opportunity to exercise editorial
control over network programming "triggered the duty to censor").
354. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (cautioning that "First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive").
355. See supra Part I.B; cf Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 525 (Cal. 2006) (observing
that intermediaries are not in a position to assess whether the content is in fact defamatory
because "[diefamation law is complex, requiring consideration of multiple factors. These include
whether the statement at issue is true or false, factual or figurative, privileged or unprivileged,
whether the matter is of public or private concern, and whether the plaintiff is a public or private
figure").
356. Of course, intermediaries have other concerns as well, including a desire to avert the
potential negative publicity that can arise from being sued for facilitating tortious or illegal
speech.
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While the first concern is outside the scope of the present study,
there is considerable research elsewhere that looks at the risk
premiums parties must bear as a result of uncertainty regarding legal
liability. 3"' As discussed in Part 1, 358 this uncertainty has an
especially pernicious effect in the speech context because threats of
civil and criminal liability often result in excessive self-censorship.
Moreover, when an intermediary engages in this form of censorship,
the effects are magnified because, as Justice Brennan observed fifty
years ago, the intermediary's censorship becomes the "public's
burden, for by restricting [the intermediary] the public's access to
[speech] would be restricted." "'
With regard to an intermediary's desire to determine the
likelihood that it will win a case, the present study suggests that
intermediaries have fared quite well under section 230, with courts
granting preemption as to at least one claim in nearly two-thirds of
the decisions. 360 But the preemption rate under section 230 tells only
part of the story. When dismissals on grounds other than section 230
are included in the calculations, the results for defendants are even
better; overall, defendants won dismissal in 76% of the cases
studied. 361
This high rate of dismissal raises the question of why plaintiffs
continue to file lawsuits against intermediaries that are shielded by
section 230. While the present study cannot answer this question,
other research suggests that plaintiffs sometimes engage in litigation
to achieve strategic ends: by raising the costs for intermediaries that
facilitate the distribution of disfavored speech, plaintiffs can drive up
the speaker's costs, assuming the intermediary can pass the expenses
along, or drive the speaker off the Internet, if those costs cannot be
borne by either the speaker or the intermediary. 362 It is costly for
357. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 3, at 891-92 (discussing the ways in which corporate
entities handle the risk of liability).
358. See supra Part I.B.
359. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1959).
360. See supra Part III.C.
361. These calculations are based on completed cases that ended in dismissal on any grounds,
including statute of limitations, lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or preemption
under section 230. The calculations do not include the fifteen cases that were pending at the time
of this study.
362. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at 39; cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997)
(invalidating large sections of the CDA because they "would confer broad powers of censorship,
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intermediaries to dispute even meritless claims. It is far less costly to
simply remove or block the speech at issue. A "profit-maximizing
intermediary likely will choose the path that is least costly, rather
than the one that preserves the most speech." 36 3 This fact has not
gone unnoticed by potential plaintiffs. "
Accordingly, intermediaries are keenly interested in what it will
cost to defend a lawsuit, even when they feel confident that they will
ultimately prevail. 365 Much of the costs associated with litigation
arise during discovery, and the longer a case continues, the greater
the expenses to both parties. 366 Mindful of these costs, some courts
have refused to permit the plaintiff to engage in discovery until the
court addressed whether section 230 preempted the claims at issue in
the case. 367 In a number of other cases, the plaintiff opposed the
defendant's motion by arguing that the section 230 defense was not
ripe. This question is taken up in the next section of the Article.
1. The Proper Timing of a Section 230 Defense
There is some disagreement in the case law as to whether
section 230 can be raised in a motion to dismiss or otherwise
in the form of a 'heckler's veto,' upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on
and inform the would-be discoursers that his... child... would be present").
363. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 31.
364. In an article in Forbes, Daniel Lyons advised that the best way to deal with unfavorable
speech online is to
ATTACK THE HOST. Find some copyrighted text that a blogger has lifted from your
Web site and threaten to sue his Internet service provider under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. That may prompt the ISP to shut him down. Or threaten to drag the host
into a defamation suit against the blogger. The host isn't liable but may skip the hassle
and cut offthe blogger's access anyway.
Daniel Lyons, Attack of the Blogs!, FoRBES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 128, 132 (emphasis in original).
365. Under what is generally known as the "American Rule," each party in a lawsuit is
responsible for paying his or her own attorney's fees and costs, regardless of the outcome of the
litigation. See Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 517 (2009). Even in cases that end in settlement, the costs
can be substantial. See id.
366. Although both parties endure these costs, studies suggest that the costs of defamation
litigation disproportionately fall on the defendant. See David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel
Defamation Costs: The Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1207, 1207 (1995)
(finding that over 90% of the costs in defamation litigation are attributable to the defendants'
legal fees and expenses, while plaintiffs' legal fees and expenses account for 3.5% to 8% of total
costs).
367. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., No. CIV. 97-485 LH/LFG,
1998 WL 896459, at *2 (D.N.M July 16, 1998) (granting stay and noting that "immunity from the
burdens of litigation should appropriately be afforded to AOL"), affd, 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
2000).
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addressed before the parties have had a chance to engage in
discovery. While most courts treat section 230 as providing
immunity to qualifying defendants, 368 several courts have
characterized section 230 as an affirmative defense. 369 Because a
plaintiff generally is "not required to plead around affirmative
defenses,"3 70 the practical consequences that flow from how a court
treats this issue can be significant.
If section 230 cannot be raised at the start of the litigation, the
defendant will need to file an answer to the complaint, which will
trigger a series of obligations to confer with the plaintiff and engage
in discovery. Although a defendant may eventually succeed in
getting the case dismissed, the defendant will have had to expend
time and resources defending against a claim for which it faced no
liability. 31
In the vast majority (84.8%) of the decisions addressing a
section 230 defense prior to full discovery, neither the court nor the
parties appear to have raised the issue of the proper timing for a
section 230 defense. In several other decisions, the plaintiff conceded
that section 230 applied or the pleadings themselves provided a
sufficient factual basis for the court to make such a ruling. 372 A court
refused to address the defendant's section 230 defense prior to
discovery in only 7.6% of the decisions.373
368. See, e.g., Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1125; Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co., 206 F.3d at 983, 986.
369. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003); Novak v. Overture
Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
370. Novak, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Affirmative defenses can be raised in a motion to
dismiss, however, if the existence of the defense is clear from the complaint itself See, e.g.,
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 416, 425 (lst Cir. 2007). For
example, when a complaint reveals that the cause of action accrued earlier than is permitted under
the applicable statute of limitations, this defense may be raised on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g.,
Guerrero v. Gates, 357 F.3d 911, 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). As previously noted, the fact that the
defendant qualifies as an ISP is often apparent from the complaint itself. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
371. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157,
1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that "section 230 must be interpreted to protect Web sites not merely
from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles").
372. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 415; Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d
523, 536-37 (D. Md. 2006); PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko's, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1071
(D.S.D. 2001).
373. See, e.g., GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657; Curran v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:07-0354,
2008 WL 472433, at *14 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 19, 2008); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holders,
LLC., No. 3:06-cv-1710 (JCH), 2007 WL 1186026, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007); Novak, 309
F. Supp. 2d at 452.
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However, even in jurisdictions that permit a defendant to move
for dismissal under section 230 prior to the completion of discovery,
the defendant cannot do so until it first makes an appearance in the
case and files a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to
dismiss. As a result, intermediaries face costs even when they
succeed in getting a case dismissed at an early stage in the litigation.
One way to estimate these costs is to calculate the number of
days that elapsed between the filing of the lawsuits under study and
the court's decision addressing the application of section 230.
Although it is likely to be an imperfect proxy for the costs the parties
incurred during the pendency of the litigation, we generally can
assume that the longer the period between the filing and the decision,
the greater the costs to the parties.
On average, nearly a year elapsed between the date the plaintiffs
in the cases studied filed their complaints and the date the trial court
judges issued decisions addressing the defendants' section 230
defense. "' Trial court judges issued their decisions an average of 50
days earlier if they found preemption under section 230 as to at least
one claim in the case than they did if they found no preemption. "'
Not surprisingly, whether the court granted preemption before or
after the completion of discovery had the largest impact on how
much time elapsed. If a trial court found preemption prior to
discovery, it did so an average of 279 days after the complaint was
filed. 376 If the court found preemption after discovery, that time
frame stretched to an average of 521 days, a statistically significant
difference of 242 days. 3" Accordingly, we can conclude that a
court's willingness to entertain a defendant's section 230 defense in a
motion to dismiss or another pre-discovery motion had a significant
and substantial impact on the costs the defendant faced.
374. See table infra in note 377.
375. The difference between the mean number of days for decisions granting and not granting
preemption, however, was not statistically significant (unpaired t-test p-value = 0.391).
376. See table infra in note 377.
377. Summaries of the statistics showing the elapsed days for decisions granting preemption
in trial courts are provided below. The difference in means was statistically significant with an
unpaired t-testp-value of 0.0002.
Posture Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum
Before Full Discovery 279 254 149.6 708
After Discovery 521.2 477 383.3 1556
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2. Imposition of Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees
One way for defendants to recoup their litigation costs, if they
are successful in having the case dismissed, is through fee-shifting
provisions. While a number of federal statutes contain provisions that
provide for the prevailing party to recover some or all of its legal
costs,"37 section 230 is not one of those statutes. Nevertheless, some
of the cases studied involved claims arising under other statutes or
state laws that contained fee-shifting provisions, and even without
these provisions, courts retained the discretion to award sanctions in
the most egregious cases, although no court has done so to date in a
section 230 case.
Overall, the issue of sanctions or attorneys' fees arose in 19 of
the 110 decisions (17.3%) in which a court found preemption under
section 230 as to at least one claim in the case. In 5 of those
decisions, the court awarded sanctions or fees to the defendant. In
the remaining 14 decisions, the court denied the defendant's request
for fees or sanctions. 380
In summary, while section 230 has largely protected
intermediaries from liability for third-party speech, it has not been a
free pass for defendants. Even in cases where the court found section
230 preempted the plaintiffs claims, intermediaries bore liability in
the form of litigation costs that they were unable to recoup from
plaintiffs. As discussed in Part I, we should be mindful that litigation
costs imposed on intermediaries, even those that do not bear liability,
can have a chilling effect on their willingness to facilitate the speech
of others.
378. Ashley E. Compton, Shifting the Blame: The Dilemma of Fee-Shifting Statutes and Fee-
Waiver Settlements, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 761, 763-64 (2009).
379. E.g., Higher Balance, LLC v. Quantum Future Group, Inc., No. 08-233-HA, 2008 WL
5281487 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2008) (awarding fees under Oregon anti-SLAPP statute); Hamad v. Ctr.
for the Study of Popular Culture, No. 06-cv-285 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 17, 2007) (awarding
sanctions under Rule 11); Barrett v. Clark, No. 833021-5, 2001 WL 881259 (Cal. Super. Ct. July
25, 2001) (awarding fees under California anti-SLAPP statute); cf Steele v. Mengelkoch, No.
A07-1375, 2008 WL 2966529 (Minn. Ct. App. August 5, 2008) (affuming dismissal of claims
under section 230, but reversing award of sanctions raised sua sponte by lower court because
plaintiff not given opportunity to withdraw complaint).
380. E.g., Associated Bank-Corp. v. Earthlink Inc., 2005 WL 2240952 (W.D. Wis. 2005);
Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389, 389 (Ariz. App. Div. 2005); Univ. Comm.
Sys. Inc. v. Lycos Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 413 (Mass. 2007).
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C. Assessing Section 230's Impact on Plaintiffs
Countless law review pages have been devoted to debating the
question of why plaintiffs file lawsuits. Obviously, there is no one
answer that applies to all plaintiffs or all claims. In the context of
defamation and other speech-based torts, which are at the heart of the
claims covered by section 230, research has shown that plaintiffs
primarily want the tortious material to be removed or corrected.
Secondarily, they want to recover against the parties responsible.
This section of the Article examines whether plaintiffs were
successful in achieving either of these objectives.
First, however, a few caveats. The data from this study cannot
tell us how many people have been harmed by speech online. 382 Nor
can the data tell us how many cases plaintiffs would have filed were
it not for section 230. 383 The only thing the data can tell us is how
plaintiffs fared in the cases studied.
1. Finding and Suing the Source
A party who believes he or she has been harmed by speech
online faces a number of choices, including whether and whom to
sue. The intermediaries that facilitated the harm often make
appealing targets because typically they have the power to remove
the harmful speech, the resources to pay damages, and an online
presence that makes them easy to identify. 384 But as the previous
381. See Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the
Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REv. 226, 228 (1985) (reporting that only 20% of the surveyed
plaintiffs sued to obtain money as compensation for the alleged libel). Instead, "the major
motivating factors are restoring reputation, correcting what plaintiffs view as falsity, and
vengeance." Randall P. Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What
Plaintiffs Get, 74 CAL. L. REv. 789, 791 (1986).
382. This study necessarily excludes cases without decisions and legal claims that were not
adjudicated. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4, 26 (1983).
383. Because section 230 sets such a high bar for intermediary liability, some plaintiffs may
have brought other causes of action, such as vicarious copyright liability, to force the removal of
content. See Kreimer, supra note 6, at 86-87.
384. In the offline world, the publishers of content, not the distributors, were the ones with the
deep pockets. Because it required substantial capital to publish a book or newspaper, publishers
had to be well capitalized. Distributors such as bookstores, libraries, and newsstands had
relatively little capital in comparison. Not surprisingly, plaintiffs tended to focus on suing
publishers because those deeper pockets meant they could recover damages and pay for the cost
of the lawsuit. See Robert W. Hamilton, Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 8
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 733, 736 (1998). Today, this relationship is inverted-the deep pockets
now reside with the intermediaries.
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sections in the Article have shown,"' section 230 provides broad
protections for intermediaries. Except in the rare instances when the
defendant-intermediary who interposed section 230 was actually the
source of the content at issue (9.6% of the decisions), courts have
found that the plaintiffs claims were preempted in nearly seven out
of ten decisions. 386
While section 230 provides a high bar for plaintiffs to overcome
when suing an intermediary, it presents no bar to a lawsuit against
the original source of the content. Before a plaintiff can recover from
the source, however, he or she must first identify the source. As
reported in Part III, 41.2% of the decisions studied involved
anonymous content. 387 While not insurmountable, the fact that a
source is anonymous makes the plaintiffs task more challenging. In
order to uncover the anonymous source's identity, the plaintiff can
either sue the unidentified source as a "John Doe" in the existing
case and request the identifying information from the intermediary
through the discovery process, or use a third-party subpoena to
request identifying information from another entity that has the
relevant information. 388
In order to capture how often plaintiffs sued the original source,
each case from which a decision arose was analyzed to determine
whether the plaintiff sued the source in that case or in another
case. 389 In more than half of the cases (51.1%), the plaintiffs sued the
source of the content as well as the intermediary in the same case. In
sixteen additional cases, the plaintiffs sued the third-party source in
another case or jurisdiction. In total, plaintiffs sued the third-party
385. See supra Part II.
386. See supra Part III.C.
387. See supra note 229 and accompanying text discussing how anonymity was defined for
purposes of this study.
388. In either situation, courts typically require that the plaintiff demonstrate, inter alia, that
she has evidence to support each element of her underlying legal claim before ordering
disclosure. See Dendrite Int'l v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. App. Div. 2001); Lyrissa Barnett
Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe?, 50 B.C. LAW REV.
1373, 1378 (2009). In thirty of the seventy-nine cases (38%) in which the plaintiffs sued the
third-party source, the source was identified as being anonymous. This study did not seek to
determine whether plaintiffs were successful in unmasking these third-party sources.
389. This involved the following research: (1) search by party name in the state court docket
(if the state makes docket available online) or PACER for federal cases; (2) search by party name
in Westlaw dockets database; (3) search via Google for case information; and, if necessary, (4)
send an e-mail to the plaintiff's lawyers using contact information available on Westlaw, LEXIS,
PACER, or Google. If no information could be found, the case was tagged as unknown.
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source of the content at issue in 79 of the 140 cases (56.4%) that
were examined. 390
Of course, finding and suing the source only gets a plaintiff
partway to his or her goal. Accordingly, each case in which the
plaintiff sued the source was examined to determine whether the
court found the source liable. 39 Figure G reports the results.
Plaintiffs were able to impose liability on the third-party source in
only 16% of the seventy-six cases in which they sued the third-party
source. In 43.2% of the cases, a court held that the third-party source
had no liability.
FIGURE G
PROPORTION OF CASES FINDING














390. As noted previously, while the number of decisions under study totaled 184, each case
was capable of generating more than one decision so there were fewer cases than decisions.
391. If the plaintiff sued the source in the current case, then liability was assessed by
examining the current case docket. If the plaintiff sued the source in another case, a research
assistant conducted the following research: (1) review the state court docket (if the docket was
available online) or PACER for federal cases; (2) search via Google for case information; and, if
necessary, (4) send an e-mail to the plaintiffs lawyers using contact information available on
Westlaw, LEXIS, PACER, or Google. If no information could be found, the case disposition was
tagged as unknown.
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At first blush, a 16% success rate would seem to be abysmally
low, and it likely feels that way for those plaintiffs who saw their
cases end without a finding of liability. Put in context, however,
plaintiffs in the cases studied fared slightly better than plaintiffs in
typical defamation cases. 392 As figure G shows, 20% of the cases
remain pending. In addition, we were unable to determine the status
of another 12% of the cases, so the overall success rate for plaintiffs
may end up being above or below 16%.
2. Content Removal
Plaintiffs appear to have fared better with regard to their other
objective: the removal or correction of harmful information. While
section 230 does not mandate that an intermediary remove tortious or
illegal content, even upon notification or request by the plaintiff, a
number of intermediaries did so in any event.
In order to assess the current availability of the content at issue
in each case, a research assistant was tasked with identifying the
content and determining whether it was currently available from the
defendant; if the content was no longer available, the researcher
recorded the reason why it was unavailable. "' This research showed
that in more than half of the cases (55%), the content plaintiffs sued
over was no longer available as of mid-2009. As to an additional
3.6% of the cases, some but not all of the content was available.
Table 16 reports these results as well as the reasons the content was
unavailable, if that information could be determined.
As table 16 shows, for those cases in which the content was no
longer available, the unavailability was attributable to the
defendant's voluntary removal in more than a quarter of the cases. In
a number of these cases, the court mentioned in its decisions that the
392. In a study of libel litigation during the period 1974-1984, researchers at the University
of Iowa found that plaintiffs succeeded in imposing liability on media defendants in only 12.6%
of the cases. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY 116 tbl.6-6 (1987); David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current
Data on Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REv. 503, 511 (2001) (reporting that media defendants won
pretrial dismissal in nearly 77% of defamation cases studied for the period 1980-1996).
393. This was accomplished by examining the decision and, if necessary, the complaint and
other filings in the case to identify the content at issue in the plaintiff's claims. If the content
could not be specifically identified, its availability was tagged as unknown. The researcher then
performed a search for the content on the intermediary's Web site or online service. If it was not
available, the reasons were determined by reviewing the court record and any statements on the
defendant's Web site or online service. Additional information on these procedures is provided in
the Appendix.
490 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:373
defendant had voluntarily removed the offensive material. 4 In
another 18.3% of the cases, the defendant's Web site was defunct. In
a small number of cases (4.9%), all or some of the material was no
longer available because of a court order.
394. See, e.g., Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1319; Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 F.3d at 985-86;
Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-30.
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As table 16 reports, some of the content at issue also was
unavailable because the case was settled, which occurred in 18 of the
140 cases studied (12.9%). This rate of settlement was slightly below
the settlement rate in non-Internet libel cases reported by other
researchers. 9 In the majority of the cases studied (61.4%), the court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, while in only 5.7%
of the cases, the court issued a verdict in the plaintiffs favor.
Approximately 1 out of every 10 cases (10.7%) is still pending.
Overall, these findings present a mixed picture for plaintiffs in
the cases studied. On the one hand, as to almost two-thirds of all
claims for which a defendant or the court interposed section 230 as a
defense, plaintiffs were unable to proceed against the intermediaries
who facilitated the publication or distribution of content they
believed had caused them harm. Yet the data show that plaintiffs
were not left without a remedy. In more than half of the cases
studied, plaintiffs sued the original source of the content at issue in
the case. Although plaintiffs were largely unsuccessful in
establishing that the third-party source was liable for their injuries,
they appear to have done slightly better-with a 16% success rate-
than plaintiffs typically do in defamation cases.
On the other hand, if success is measured by how often plaintiffs
were able to get the harmful content removed, then they achieved
some measure of success. In more than half of the cases studied
(55%), the harmful material was no longer available from the
defendant-intermediary at the time this research was conducted.
CONCLUSION
In the thirteen years since its enactment, section 230 has become
one of the most important-and one of the most intensely
criticized-statutes impacting speech on the Internet. This criticism
comes from both sides of the spectrum. Those who believe section
230 goes too far in privileging intermediaries suggest that it should
be narrowed to allow notice-based liability or be repealed altogether.
Those who think section 230 does not go far enough suggest that it
should be expanded to cover additional claims and to include a fee-
shifting provision to deter meritless claims against intermediaries.
395. See Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation: Setting the Record
Straight, supra note 381, at 228 (reporting that 15% of libel cases settle).
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It is likely that both sides will find support for their arguments in
this study. While section 230 has largely protected intermediaries
from liability for third-party speech, it has not been the free pass
many of its proponents claim and its critics lament it to be. Indeed,
intermediaries continue to face legal claims arising from the speech
of third parties. Even in cases where the court found that section 230
preempted plaintiffs' claims, intermediaries bore liability in the form
of litigation costs, and it took the court nearly a year, on average, to
issue a decision addressing an intermediary's defense under section
230.
Scholars who follow these cases closely will likely be surprised
to find that more than a third of the claims at issue in the cases
survived section 230's broad protection. In the majority of those
decisions, however, the courts did not need to reach the question of
section 230's application because they found that the claims against
the intermediary warranted dismissal on other grounds. When these
decisions are included in the calculations, defendants won dismissal
on section 230 or other grounds in more than three-quarters of the
cases studied.
As to section 230's impact on plaintiffs, the data revealed that
section 230 has not been a complete bar to relief. A large proportion
of plaintiffs were able to identify and sue the original source of the
content that caused them harm. Although their success rate in those
suits was quite low, it was not out of line with findings from other
studies examining defamation litigation. Moreover, in more than half
of the cases studied, plaintiffs succeeded in getting the offensive
content removed from the defendants' Web sites or online services.
As with any empirical study, especially one that is the first to
systematically examine a body of case law, there are many ways to
view and interpret the data. The intent of this research was not to
foreclose discussion of the important issues at play in what is largely
a normative debate. The decision to privilege intermediaries clearly
has had repercussions for those who have been harmed by speech or
conduct online. Whether the benefit to society that comes from
providing broad protections to intermediaries that facilitate speech
outweighs the harms that go unredressed is not something this study
can answer.
If Congress considers modifying section 230, it should keep in
mind that the rich informational ecosystem we know today is not
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simply a product of the decentralized, open architecture of the
Internet. It is a function of the "breathing space" Internet
intermediaries currently have under the law to facilitate speech that
may be injurious or illegal. Whether the Internet remains open to
diverse forms of speech will depend to a considerable degree on
whether the intermediaries that make it function can continue to be
agnostic as to the content they intermediate.
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APPENDIX
This appendix describes the methodology employed in the
collection and analysis of judicial decisions involving section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act396 that form the basis for Free
Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels. An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act. It also includes several additional tables of data that
supplement the main text.
I. METHODOLOGY
The collection and coding of judicial decisions involved the
following methodology.
A. Target Population
The population of interest for this study is all reported judicial
decisions from February 8, 1996-the effective date of section 230-
through September 30, 2009, in which a party or the court interposed
section 230 as a defense to liability for content or acts online.
B. Sample Selection
To collect the relevant decisions, I ran searches for decisions
citing section 230 on Westlaw397 and LEXIS,3 98 the two primary
legal research services, and in the online Legal Threats Database
maintained by the Citizen Media Law Project at the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society at Harvard University (the "CMLP
Database"). 9
396. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
397. On Westlaw, I ran the following search in the ALLCASES database at the start of the
research and again at the conclusion on November 15, 2009: "47 U.S.C. § 230" & da (bef
9/30/2009). This search yielded 208 decisions. I then ran a KeyCite search in the Westlaw USCA
database for cases citing 47 U.S.C. § 230, which yielded 256 citing decisions within the target
date range.
398. On LEXIS, I ran the following search in the Federal & State Cases, Combined database
at the start of the research and again at the conclusion on November 15, 2009: "47 U.S.C. § 230"
and date leq (9/30/2009). This search yielded 215 decisions. I then ran a Shephard's search on
Lexis for cases citing 47 U.S.C. § 230, which yielded 221 citing decisions within the target date
range.
399. The Citizen Media Law Project, which the author directs, maintains a publicly accessible
database of lawsuits, cease & desist letters, subpoenas, and other legal threats directed at those
who engage in online speech. See Citizen Media Law Project, Legal Threats Database,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/database (last visited Jan. 4, 2010). The database contains decisions
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To be counted as a judicial decision, the decision must have
announced a disposition of the case or motion under consideration
(e.g., denied, granted, dismissed, affirmed) and must have stated at
least one reason for the decision. If a decision met these criteria, it
was included in the universe of cases to be coded, regardless of the
form of the decision. 400
A research assistant reviewed the results to identify any
decisions reported uniquely in either LEXIS or Westlaw. This review
yielded a total of 249 decisions within the target date range from the
two databases. In order to find unreported decisions, I also ran a
search for lawsuit entries in the CMLP Database. 401 This yielded 12
additional decisions that had not been reported on LEXIS or
Westlaw. I then reviewed all of the decisions to exclude those that
mentioned section 230 only in passing or otherwise had tangential
relevance to its use as a defense to liability for content or acts online.
I excluded 77 decisions on this basis.402 This left 184 judicial
decisions in the sample set. 403 Table A-1 summarizes where the
judicial decisions that made up the study were found.
from, among other sources, Westlaw, LEXIS, Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), legal blogs, and
reader tips.
400. This definition mirrors the approach taken in the U.S. Court of Appeals Database, an
interdisciplinary research effort to study judicial decision making. See Donald R. Songer, The
United State Court of Appeals Database: Documentation for Phase 1, at 8.
401. I ran a search for lawsuit entries containing the subject area tag "section 230" and "date
on or before 9/30/2009." Most entries in the database include the underlying pleadings, which
were acquired from the U.S. Federal Court's PACER system and similar state court electronic
docketing systems. See Citizen Media Law Project, supra note 4.
402. A plurality of the decisions (n = 33) were removed from the sample set because the
reference to section 230 was merely definitional (e.g., used to provide a definition for an
interactive computer service in another context or to define the Internet generally).
403. It is important to note that this study relies on a sample of the relevant decisions.
Although I sought to study the entire population of judicial decisions in which a party or the court
interposed section 230 as a defense to liability for content online, I cannot be sure that I collected
every decision. It is likely that some decisions, especially in state courts, escaped my notice. Like
other studies attempting to empirically examine case law, the exclusion of some unpublished
decisions may bias the results to the extent that there is a systematic difference between available
and unavailable decisions. See Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure
Duties and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1884-87
(2005).
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TABLE A-1
SOURCE OF RELEVANT DECISIONS




Westlaw and LEXIS 151 82.1%
Westlaw only 20 10.9%
LEXIS only 1 0.5%
Citizen Media Law Project 12 6.5%
Total 184
C. Coding
Each decisions was then coded in order to capture general data
about the decision (e.g., date, caption, venue, posture); data about the
Web site or publication medium involved; data about the decision
specifically related to section 230 (e.g., disposition of the defense,
appeal status); specific areas of judicial focus in the decision (e.g.,
whether the court analyzed the scope of the parties covered by
section 230, the nature of the defendant's relationship to the source
of the content); and various miscellaneous data about the case (e.g.,
whether the plaintiff sued the third-party source of the content,
whether the information was submitted anonymously, whether the
court awarded sanctions or fees).
To check the reliability of the coding process, I selected a
random sample of 18 decisions from the 184 decisions in the study
set. A second coder independently coded this sample of eighteen
cases, and the results of the two coded listings were compared in
order to assess the degree of inter-coder reliability. 404
D. Case and Party Research
As part of the coding process, various case and party attributes
were recorded for each decision in the study set. This research
consisted of the research methods described below.
404. The percentage rate of agreement and "Krippendorf's alpha" for each of the data fields is
listed on the coding form, which is available on the author's Web site at
http://www.citmedialaw.org/section-230-empirical-study. See KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 221-30 (2d ed. 2004).
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1. Third Party Sued in Another Case
Whether a third party was sued in another case was determined
through the following research: (1) a search by party name in the
state court docket (if the state makes the docket available online) or
PACER for federal cases; (2) a search by party name in the Westlaw
dockets database; (3) a search via Google for case information; and if
necessary, (4) a request for information via an email to the plaintiff's
lawyers using the contact information available on Westlaw, LEXIS,
PACER, or Google. If no information could be found, the case was
tagged as unknown.
2. Third-Party Source Liability
If the plaintiff sued the source in the current case, then liability
was assessed by examining the current case docket. If the plaintiff
sued the source in another case, a research assistant conducted the
following research: (1) a review of the state court docket (if the
docket was available online) or PACER for federal cases; (2) a
search via Google for case information; and, if necessary, (3) a
request for information via an email to the plaintiffs lawyers using
the contact information available on Westlaw, LEXIS, PACER, or
Google. If no information could be found, the case disposition was
tagged as unknown.
3. Content Available Online
Whether the online content at issue was available was assessed
by examining the decision and, if necessary, the complaint and other
filings in the case to identify the content at issue in the plaintiffs
claims. If the content could not be specifically identified, its
availability was tagged as unknown. A research assistant then
performed a search for the content on the intermediary's Web site or
online service. If it was not available, the reasons for its
unavailability were determined by reviewing the court record and
any statements on the defendant's Web site or online service.
4. Anonymous Online Content
Whether the online content was anonymous or attributable to an
anonymous source was assessed by examining the decision and, if
necessary, the complaint and other filings in the case to identify the
content at issue in the plaintiff's claims. For the purposes of this
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analysis, a decision was tagged as involving anonymous speech if the
court noted that the speech was anonymous or the parties stated that
the source was unknown.
5. Case Disposition
The disposition of the case was determined through (1) a review
of the docket on PACER, Westlaw or the state court filing system to
determine the outcome of the case; (2) a search via Google for
information about the case; or (3) a request for information via an
email to the lawyers in the case using the contact information
available on Westlaw, LEXIS, PACER, or Google. If no information
could be found, the case was tagged as unknown.
6. Verdict or Settlement Amount
The verdict or the settlement amount was determined through
(1) a review of the docket on PACER, Westlaw or the state court
filing system to determine the outcome of the case; (2) a search via
Google for information about the case; or (3) a request for
information via an email to the lawyers in the case using the contact
information available on Westlaw, LEXIS, PACER, or Google. If no
information could be found, the case was tagged as unknown.
7. Appeal Status
The status of any appeal was determined through (1) a review of
the docket on PACER, Westlaw or the state court filing system to
determine the outcome of the case; (2) a search via Google for
information about the case; or (3) a request for information via an
email to the lawyers in the case using the contact information
available on Westlaw, LEXIS, PACER, or Google. If no information
could be found, the case was tagged as unknown.
E. Analysis
I analyzed the coded data using Stata 11 for Windows, a
statistical software package in wide use within the social and natural
sciences. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet containing the data is
available upon request from the author and will be posted on the
author's Web site.
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II. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE A-2
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TABLE A-2 (continued)
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TABLE A-3
DISTRIBUTION OF DECISIONS BY POSTURE OF SECTION 230 ISSUE
Preemption Found
Number NumberPosture of Percentage of Percentage
Potr f of Total of of Total
Decisions Decisions
Preliminary Injunction 2 1.1% 1 50.0%
Discovery 2 1.1% 0 0%
Motion for Leave to Amend 3 1.6% 1 33.3%
Judgment on the Pleadings 9 4.9% 7 77.8%
Motion to Dismiss 95 51.6% 58 61.1%
Motion to Remand 2 1.1% 0 0%
Motion to Strike 16 8.7% 6 37.5%
Summary Judgment 48 26.1% 32 66.7%
Bench Trial 3 1.6% 3 100%
Jury Trial 2 1.1% 0 0%
Motion for Sanctions or Fees 2 1.1% 2 100%
Total 110 59.8%
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TABLE A-4




Aiding and Abetting 2 100%
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection 1 0%
Anti-Scalping 1 100%
Anti-Spam Act 2 50.0%
Autographed Sports Memorabilia Statute 1 100%
Breach Of Contract 10 70.0%
Business Disparagement 3 66.7%
Child Sexual Abuse 1 0%
Civil Rights Act (federal law) 1 100%
Civil Rights Act (state law) 1 100%
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 1 100%
Conspiracy 15 60.0%
Consumer Protection Act (state law) 9 44.4%
Conversion 1 0%
Copyright Infringement (common law) 2 0%
Cyberstalking 3 66.7%
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices 36 50.0%
Defamation 73 64.4%
Discrimination 3 0%
Distribution of Child Pornography 5 40.0%
Distribution of Obscene Material 3 66.7%
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 1 0%
Fair Housing Act 4 50.0%
False Advertising 6 33.3%
False Endorsement 1 0%
False Light 8 75.0%
Fraud 12 66.7%
Free Speech 4 50.0%
Harassment 7 28.6%
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TABLE A-4 (continued)
UNREVERSED PREEMPTION RATES BY LEGAL CLAIM
Claim Frequency Preemptionof Claim Rate
Injury to Business Reputation 1 100%
Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress 23 65.2%
Intrusion 3 33.3%
Invasion Of Privacy 8 62.5%
Libel 10 50.0%
Misappropriation of Name or Likeness 5 20.0%
Negligence 65 84.6%
Nuisance 5 80.0%
Products Liability 6 83.3%
Promissory Estoppel 2 50.0%
Public Disclosure of Private Facts 4 50.0%
RICO 2 0%
Right of Publicity 13 30.8%
Spoliation 1 0%
Spoliation of Evidence 1 100%
Substantive Due Process 1 100%
Telemarketing & Consumer Fraud and Abuse 1 0%
Tortious Interference 36 61.1%
Trade Libel 5 60.0%
Trade Secrets 1 100%
Trademark Dilution 3 33.3%
Trademark Infringement 4 0%
Trespass 2 50.0%
Unjust Enrichment 7 42.9%
Waste of Public Funds 1 100%
Willful and Wanton Conduct 2 100%
Total 429 60.1%
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